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Punitive Damages in Products Liability
Actions: A Comparative Critique of the
Puerto Rican and Californian
Traditions
I. INTRODUCTION
On New Years Eve 1986, a fire is deliberately set in a first-floor
ballroom of the San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel in San Juan, Puerto
Rico. The ballroom is consumed with flames. The fire moves rapidly
through the hotel's lobby and casino. The conflagration kills ninety-
seven people and injures one hundred and forty.' It is the deadliest
fire in the United States since the 1980 MGM-Grand Hotel blaze in
Las Vegas, Nevada.2
While the fire at the hotel still smolders, plaintiffs' attorneys de-
scend upon San Juan. Some seek to protect the interests of legiti-
mately-obtained clients. Others openly solicit business.3 Like their
colleagues after the Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal, India, these
attorneys seek to profit from death and human misery. 4 However,
they will return to the mainland less satisfied than on other
excursions.
The Dupont Plaza litigation will require at least two separate tri-
als. 5 The first, which centers on ownership of the hotel and its liabil-
ity to those injured or killed, ends in a $150 million settlement.6 The
second trial, which is currently pending in Federal District Court for
the District of Puerto Rico, centers on the liability of certain manu-
facturers whose products allegedly contributed to the injuries and
deaths. 7
1. Carbonara, Taming a Mass Torts Monster, AM. LAW., Sept. 1989, at 108.
2. Id. (the MGM-Grand Hotel fire claimed 84 lives).
3. Id. at 110.
4. For detailed descriptions of the ethically-questionable conduct of attorneys in the San
Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel fire, as well as other mass disaster cases, see id. at l10-11; Jenkins,
Courting Disaster, GENTLEMAN'S Q., Feb. 1989, at 215.
5. Federal Judge Raymond Acosta originally divided the case into seven different trials.
Carbonara, supra note 1, at 108. After the settlement of the first trial on hotel ownership, and
the consolidation of product and supplier actions into one trial, three other trials were sched-
uled to be heard in the matter before Judge Acosta. Id. at 113.
6. See id. at 112.
7. Id.
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In this second trial, the plaintiffs make out a claim for punitive
damages: "Defendant's conduct under the circumstances was mali-
cious and amounted to gross negligence, wanton, willful and reckless
misconduct, and gross disregard for the plaintiffs' safety, thereby ren-
dering defendant liable to the plaintiffs for punitive damages under
applicable choice of law principles in addition to compensatory
damages. "8
Defendant manufacturers then file a motion for directed verdict,
seeking to disallow the plaintiffs' demand for punitive damages. 9 On
August 3, 1990, Judge Raymond Acosta determines that under appli-
cable choice of law principles, Puerto Rican law will govern the puni-
tive damages issue. 10 Since Puerto Rican law does not allow for
punitive damages," the obscenely large damage awards normally as-
sociated with a disaster on the scale of the Dupont Plaza Hotel fire
will be severely limited. As a result, the plaintiffs' attorneys in this
products liability action will earn a smaller contingency fee than they
anticipated.
Puerto Rico's refusal to allow punitive damages is the beginning
point of this Comment's analysis. The island of Puerto Rico is a civil
law jurisdiction that also adheres to a well-developed common law
tradition. Elements of both judicial traditions co-exist in the terri-
tory's well-developed body of case law. For example, Puerto Rican
products liability law closely mirrors that of California, a tort law
trend-setter. 12 However, Puerto Rico does not follow California's
lead on the availability of punitive damages in products liability
actions.
This point, while seemingly small in the larger scope of judicial
action in Puerto Rico, highlights a significant difference in judicial
attitudes and philosophies between the two jurisdictions. Further, the
rationales that underlie Puerto Rican and Californian policy shed
light on the theoretical propriety of punitive damages.
This Comment will highlight these differences, attempt to
8. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint at para. LLLLL.9, In re San Juan Dupont
Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 745 F. Supp. 79 (D.P.R. 1990) (MDL No. 721).
9. In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 745 F. Supp. 79, 80 (D.P.R.
1990).
10. Id. at 87.
11. Puerto Rico, Louisiana, and Nebraska prohibit punitive damages entirely. Indiana
allows punitive damages, but only if the defendant's conduct is not also punishable as a crime.
See Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of Punitive Damages in Products Liability
Litigation, 74 Ky. L.J. 1, 4 n.9 (1985).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 66-99.
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achieve an understanding of both sides of the issue, and will conclude
that the increasing trend of manufacturer liability for punitive dam-
ages is arguably a judicial anomaly with severe economic and social
repercussions.
II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTIONS IN
PUERTO Rico
Puerto Rico's unique relationship with the United States signifi-
cantly affects the commonwealth's legal system. A short history of
this relationship and its legal effects will provide background on Pu-
erto Rico's judicial system. Such an historical perspective will facili-
tate the task of explaining how the island arrived at its seemingly
anomalous positions on products liability and punitive damages.
A. History of Puerto Rico's Judicial System
Although the history of Puerto Rico, and the Spanish occupation
of that island, spans centuries,' 3 only a small portion of that history
fits within the scope of this Comment. Spain "discovered"' 4 Puerto
Rico in 1493 and claimed it in the name of civilization.'" During the
next 400 years, Puerto Rico remained a politically-neglected Spanish
colony. The island's principal value to the crown consisted of its stra-
tegic position along the trade routes in the Caribbean archipelago.'
6
Cultural bonds, however, developed during this period, including the
assimilation of a common language and the introduction of European
legal institutions, which the sovereign extended to its colonies.'
7
United States involvement with Puerto Rico began on July 25,
1898, when American expeditionary forces landed on the island dur-
ing the Spanish-American war.' 8 On August 12, 1898, a peace proto-
col suspended hostilities between the United States and Spain.19 The
two nations signed the Treaty of Paris on December 10, 1898, for-
13. For a detailed background of the colonial and pre-colonial history of the island, see
generally Cain & Moya, The Legal System of Puerto Rico, US.A., in 1 MODERN LEGAL SYS-
TEMS CYCLOPEDIA, ch. 4, § 1.3(A)-(E), at 1.80.8-.12 (K. Redden ed. 1988).
14. Taino indians lived on the island prior to the Spaniards' arrival. Id. § 1.3(A), at
1.80.8.
15. Id. § 1.3(B), at 1.80.9; Ramos, Interaction of Civil Law and Anglo-American Law in
the Legal Method in Puerto Rico (pts. 1 & 2), 23 TUL. L. REV. 1, 4, 345 (1948).
16. See Cain & Moya, supra note 13, § 1.3(D), at 1.80.10.
17. Ramos, supra note 15, at 4-5.
18. Id. at 3.
19. 30 Stat. 1742 (1898).
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mally ending the conflict. 20 Article II of the treaty provided that,
"Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto Rico .... ,,21
The United States exercised legal authority in Puerto Rico before
the countries actually signed the Treaty of Paris. On October 18,
1898, the United States established a provisional military government
on the island.22 Major General John R. Brooke, the Commanding
Officer of the Department of Porto Rico,23 issued his General Order
Number 1.24 This order contained provisions similar to the instruc-
tions that President William McKinley previously sent to his secre-
tary of war regarding the conduct to be observed during the military
occupation of Cuba.25 The contents of this order set the tone for
United States policy toward the Puerto Rican legal system: harmoni-
20. Treaty of Paris, Dec. 10, 1898, United States-Spain, 30 Stat. 1754, T.I.A.S. No. 343.
The agreement is also known as the Treaty of Peace. See Ramos, supra note 15, at 4.
21. Treaty of Paris, supra note 20.
22. Ramos, supra note 15, at 3. For the next eighteen months, the United States military
controlled Puerto Rico. Id. at 6. During this time, the military government issued 375 Gen-
eral Orders which were serially numbered from 1 to 39 in 1898, from 1 to 232 in 1899 and
from 1 to 104 in 1900. It also issued at least 268 other orders under the name of Circulars,
which were serially numbered I to 93 in 1898 and from 1 to 175 in 1900. The military govern-
ment also issued more than 100 unnumbered orders entitled Judicial Orders or Orders. Id. at
7. See SECRETARY OF WAR, LAWS, ORDINANCES, DECREES, AND MILITARY ORDERS HAV-
ING THE FORCE OF LAW, EFFECTIVE IN PORTO Rico, MAY 1, 1900, H.R. DoC. No. 1484,
60th Cong., 2d Sess. 2173-79 (1909) [hereinafter LAWS AND ORDINANCES] for an incomplete
compilation of those orders issued during military rule.
23. Puerto Rico was then known by its anglicized translation, "Porto Rico." The island's
name was not formally changed until 1932. Cain & Moya, supra note 13, § 1.3(E), at 1.80.11.
24. General Order No. 1 reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
The provincial and municipal laws, in so far as they affect the settlement of
private rights of persons and property and provide for the punishment of crime, will
be enforced unless they are incompatible with the changed conditions of Porto Rico,
in which event they may be suspended by the department commander. They will be
administered substantially as they were before the cession to the United States.
LAWS AND ORDINANCES, supra note 22, at 2179.
25. President McKinley's instructions to his secretary of war included the following:
Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme ... the
municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and
property and provide for the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in
force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things until they are sus-
pended or superseded by the occupying belligerent and in practice they are not usu-
ally abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the
ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlight-
ened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.
LAWS AND ORDINANCES, supra note 22, at 2177. These instructions became General Order
No. 101, of July 18, 1898, issued by the United States War Department, published, and applied
in Puerto Rico when General Nelson A. Miles landed on the island. Id. at 2174.
Before occupying Puerto Rico, the United States Army occupied Cuba, which was also a
former Spanish colony. WORLDMARK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NATIONS, Cuba §§ 8-12 (6th
ed. 1984).
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zation of the island's existing judicial system with those notions of
justice governing the mainland.
From the beginning of the United States' occupation of the is-
land, each of the five basic laws that generally existed in some form in
all civil law countries were present in Puerto Rico.26 These laws were:
(1) The Spanish Civil Code of 1888;27 (2) The Spanish Code of Com-
merce of 1885;28 (3) The Spanish Penal Code of 1870;29 (4) The Span-
ish Law of Civil Procedure of 1855;30 and (5) The Spanish Law of
Criminal Procedure of 1872. 31 The judicial system administering
these laws consisted of a supreme court and courts of first resort, in-
cluding criminal courts, civil courts, and municipal courts.3 2 The sys-
26. Ramos, supra note 15, at 5.
27. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 1 note on history (1967); see also Torres v. Rubianes, 20
P.R.R. 316 (1914). The Spanish Civil Code was extended to Puerto Rico by Royal Decree of
July 31, 1889, and took effect on January 1, 1890. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 1 note on history
(1967).
28. LAWS AND ORDINANCES, supra note 22, at 1173. The Spanish Code of Commerce
was extended to Puerto Rico by the Royal Decree of January 28, 1886. Id.
29. Id. at 625. The Spanish Penal Code was revised in 1876 and extended to Puerto Rico
by the Royal Decree of May 23, 1879. Id.
30. Id. at 242. The Spanish Law of Civil Procedure was substantially amended in 1881
and was extended to Puerto Rico by the Royal Decree of September 25, 1885. Id.
31. Id. at 759. The Spanish Law of Criminal Procedure was amended in 1879, 1882, and
1888, and was extended to Puerto Rico on October 19, 1888. Id.
32. See Cain & Moya, supra note 13, § 1.8(A), at 1.90.6. At the time of United States
occupation in 1898, Puerto Rico's judicial system was organized as follows:
(1) A municipal court in each of the towns and cities of the island, and two in San
Juan, which took cognizance of civil actions when the amount in controversy did not
exceed 200 pesos and of the offenses defined in Book III of the penal code; that is, of
offenses against public order, against the public interests, and infractions of munici-
pal ordinances. The proceedings in these courts were oral.
(2) Eleven courts of first instance and instruccidn (juzgados de primera instancia t6
instrucci6n), with their respective seats in Ponce, Mayaguez, San German, Humacao,
Vega-baja, Arecibo, Guayama, Aguadilla, Utuado, and two in the city of San Juan,
with one judge each, and with a jurisdiction over all civil actions when the amount in
controversy exceeded 200 pesos. The trial was conducted by written depositions.
These courts were also empowered to pass upon appeals (recursos de casaci6n) from
decisions of the municipal courts. The judges of these courts in their capacity as
judges of instruccidn were also charged with the conduct of initial proceedings in
criminal cases and ordering the detention or imprisonment of the presumed
offenders.
(3) One territorial court (audiencia), whose jurisdiction extended over the whole is-
land, and included appeals in civil cases from decisions of the courts of first instance.
(4) Three audiencias for criminal cases, one in Ponce, one in Mayaguez, and another
in San Juan, made up of judges of the former real audiencia and closely related with
it in all that concerned its internal government and organization. These audiencias
for criminal cases took cognizance of criminal actions for offenses committed within
the island in conformity with the provisions of the law of criminal procedure. The
trials were oral and public.
(5) The supreme court in Madrid, to which appeals (recursos de casaci6n) in civil
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tem was apparently well-developed and met the needs of the local
citizenry.33 With some exceptions, 34 the United States military simply
administered the laws and judicial institutions of Puerto Rico in a
manner similar to that which existed prior to the occupation.
a5
Military rule terminated on April 12, 1900 with congressional
passage of the Foraker Act-"An Act Temporarily to provide reve-
nues and a civil government for Porto Rico, and for other pur-
poses."' 36 In addition to legislating the island's self-governance, 37 the
cases were taken from decisions of the territorial court or audiencia, and in criminal
cases from decisions of the criminal courts in San Juan, Ponce, and Mayaguez.
To complete this statement it must be added that it was obligatory to use
stamped paper for all judicial documents, the price of which varied according to the
amount in controversy, ranging from 10 to 50 centavos per sheet.
When, in 1898, the change of sovereignty took place the judicial system was left
incomplete at its highest point. The island being separated from Spain, the insular
system was deprived of the court of cassation to pass upon appeals (recursos de casa-
ci6n) from judgements of the territorial court or audiencia territorial, and from deci-
sions of the criminal courts or audiencias de lo criminal.
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO REVISE AND COMPILE THE LAWS OF PORTO Rico, H.R.
Doc. No. 52, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 1, 102-04 (1901) (hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT].
33. Requesting the establishment of a civilian government during a message to Congress
on December 5, 1889, President McKinley stated that "[tihe system of civil jurisprudence now
adopted by the people of this island is described by competent lawyers who are familiar with it,
as thoroughly modern and scientific, so far as it relates to matters of internal business, trade,
production, and social and private right in general." Ramos, supra note 15, at 11.
34. See generally id. at 9-10 (discussing some of the more noteworthy interferences by the
United States military in the judicial affairs of the island).
35. In his report to the Secretary of War on November 22, 1901, Brigadier General
George W. Davis indicated the following:
It was known that the military government was but a temporary one, and that
within a short time-a few years, or perhaps a few months--Congress would proba-
bly legislate for the island and make laws determining the civil rights and political
status of the inhabitants. The tendency of the military government under such cir-
cumstances was naturally to abstain from interference with the courts, the laws, and
native institutions.
Ramos, supra note 15, at 8-9.
36. Organic (Foraker) Act of 1900, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77 (1901). The Act was more com-
monly known as the Foraker Act, following the name of its author, Senator Joseph Benson
Foraker, from Ohio. Ramos, supra note 15, at 8-9.
37. Among other provisions, the Foraker Act created a civilian government to replace
the military rule in place during the previous eighteen months. Organic (Foraker) Act of 1900,
ch. 191, § 40, 31 Stat. 77, 86. With regard to the judiciary, the Act provided: "It]hat the
judicial power shall be vested in the courts and tribunals of Porto Rico as already established
and now in operation...", id. § 33, 31 Stat. at 84; that "[t]he jurisdiction of said courts and
the form of procedure in them, and the various officials and attach6s thereof, respectively, shall
be the same...", id.; and that "Porto Rico shall constitute a [federal] judicial district to be
called 'the district of Porto Rico.' " Id. § 34, 31 Stat. at 84.
The Act further provided:
That writs of error and appeals from the final decisions of the supreme court of Porto
Rico and the district court of the United States shall be allowed and may be taken to
the Supreme Court of the United States in the same manner and under the same
1991] Punitive Damages in Products Liability Actions
Foraker Act initially directed the development of the island's legal
system toward harmonization with the United States' legal system.38
It required in part:
That a commission, to consist of three members, at least one
of whom shall be a native citizen of Porto Rico, shall be appointed
* . .to compile and revise the laws of Porto Rico... and to...
make a simple, harmonious, and economical government, establish
justice and secure its prompt and efficient administration . . .9
Due to time constraints, 4° the commission did not begin work
until September of 1900.41 Despite the constraints and resistance
from the local populace, 42 the commission worked in good faith to
improve conditions in Puerto Rico.43 This "good faith effort to im-
prove conditions," however, eventually gave rise to the major criti-
regulations and in the same cases as from the supreme courts of the Territories of the
United States ...."
Id. § 35, 31 Stat. at 85.
With regard to statutory governance, the Act provided "[t]hat the laws and ordinances of
Porto Rico now in force shall continue in full force and effect, except as altered, amended, or
modified hereinafter, or as altered or modified by military orders and decrees in force when
this Act shall take effect ...." Id. § 8, 31 Stat. at 79.
38. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
39. Organic (Foraker) Act of 1900, ch. 191, § 40, 31 Stat. 77, 86.
40. The Foraker Act did not take effect until May 1, 1900. Id. § 41, 31 Stat. at 86. The
final member of the three-person commission was not sworn in until July 3 of that year. Ra-
mos, supra note 15, at 15.
Thus, the commission had only nine months to familiarize itself with both the civil and
common laws as they related to Puerto Rico, to study the prevailing situation on the island, to
decide on the changes to be recommended, and to make its report to Congress. Id.
According to Manuel Rodriguez Ramos, former dean of the University of Puerto Rico
College of Law, "[i]f we were.., to use two words to describe the situations and the circum-
stances which surrounded the work of the Commission, we would write: haste and confusion."
Id. at 16.
41. Ramos, supra note 15, at 14.
42. Animosity from Puerto Rican citizens against the efforts of mainlanders seeking to
reform their familiar judicial system was perhaps a more acute difficulty than the time con-
straints. An excerpt from a report by Military Governor Davis highlights this resentment:
While few, if any, of the more enlightened natives, and none of the Spanish
commercial class, are inclined to openly comment unfavorably upon the Congres-
sional requirement that their laws be codified and changed by a foreign commission,
yet almost all, in their hearts, resent the suggestion that they themselves, unaided by
Americans, are not perfectly competent to revise and adapt their own codes if the
new conditions require it. They know that they now have an insular assembly to
which Congress has delegated the power to legislate. "What need for a code
commission?"
ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30,
1900: REPORT OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR OF PORTO Rico ON CIVIL AFFAIRS, H.R. Doc.
No. 2, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 13, at 62 (1902).
43. Ramos, supra note 15, at 17.
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cism of the commission's work-that it went too far in reforming a
legal system that appeared healthy and in no need of revision."
In its report to Congress, 45 the commission recommended a
number of changes in Puerto Rico's existing laws and legal institu-
tions.46 The commission further recommended that the local territo-
rial government implement the revision.47  Accordingly, in early
1902, Congress referred the commission's report to the Insular As-
sembly48 for proper action. 49 With the commission's report before
it,50 the Insular Assembly began its revision.51
However, revision was not an easy task. The attitudes of a
number of influential mainlanders, both in the government and legal
44. According to Juan Hernandez Lopez, the Puerto Rican member of the commission,
[s]uch were the principles and the judgment upon which the revision of the Civil
Code was based, and the sins [of the revision] can be found in that on many occasions
it leaned to the side of reform, not from a conviction that the existing institutions
were not good, but out of a desire materially to evidence our strong belief in the
principles of solidarity regarding anything which might seem just or rational.
Id. at 15.
But in the commission's own words, it was "strongly attached to the historical school of
jurisprudence ...... COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 32, at 144. According to this view,
"law is not a product of reason, its primary source is customary law and it can only be found in
history." Ramos, supra note 15, at 35. With regard to the revision of codes, this created an
intellectual obstacle. In the civil law tradition, a code represented a fresh start in the law,
while to scholars of the historical school, codes merely restated existing law. Id.
45. The report was completed on April 12, 1901, during a congressional recess. The
Commissioner submitted the report to Attorney General P.C. Knox, who later presented it to
Congress when it reconvened on December 3, 1901. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 32, at 1
(letter from P.C. Knox, Attorney General, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives).
46. See Ramos, supra note 15, at 17. The commission also recommended changes in the
Foraker Act, one of which would have granted United States citizenship to Puerto Ricans.
United States citizenship was eventually granted to Puerto Ricans in 1917. See Organic
(Jones) Act of 1917, ch. 145, § 5, 39 Stat. 951, 953 (1917).
47. Ramos, supra note 15, at 17.
With the exception of the revision of the organic act (the Foraker Act), all the
subjects intrusted [sic] to the commission are within the competency of the local
legislative assembly, and unless Congress is prepared to enact a complete code of
laws for the island, the revision of the legal system will have to be carried out by the
insular assembly.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 32, at 28.
48. The legislative branch of the local Puerto Rican government. Ramos, supra note 15,
at 12.
49. Id. at 19.
50. In 1901, the local legislature had also created, by its own statute, a similar commis-
sion, and was likewise considering its recommendations. Id. Two members of the former
commission, Leo Stanton Rowe and Hernandez Lopez, were also members of the new commis-
sion. The third member of the original commission, Joseph Daly, of New York, was replaced
by J.M. Keedy, also of New York. Id.
51. Id.
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community, presented a major obstacle to the Insular Assembly.5 2
Generally, mainlanders sought to impose their own agendas on revi-
sion.53 Some mainlanders desired to import the legal institutions of
their own states, while others were hostile to any legal system unlike
that of the United States.
54
In pursuit of revision, the Insular Assembly had essentially three
options: to preserve the island's existing legal system and codes; to
abandon the civil law system and adopt a common law approach; or
to follow the code commission's recommendation of bringing the ex-
isting civil law system into harmony with the mainland's common law
system without any sudden changes. 55
The Insular Assembly eventually adopted the code commission's
approach. 56 Puerto Rican lawmakers thereafter began a process of
cutting and pasting laws imported from the mainland onto the ex-
isting legal system.5 7 The civil code remained virtually unchanged. 58
To the extent the code of commerce did not conflict with United
States laws that were extended to Puerto Rico, the Insular Assembly
left it in force. 59 In 1902, the Insular Assembly adopted a new penal
code, borrowed from the state of Montana. 6° California lent its code
52. Id. at 17-22.
53. As commissioner Rowe relates:
To the mass of Americans resident in the island-and this is particularly true of
the lawyers-the entire system of law and government, of domestic and public insti-
tutions, was bad simply because it was different from our own.... The lawyer from
Massachusetts wanted the Massachusetts system, the lawyer from South Carolina
the South Carolina system, and so on .... The only way to make Americans of the
Porto Ricans, it was argued, was to give them, without delay, the system of law of
one of our states. "This is the way we do it in the States" was regarded as an argu-
ment sufficient to bring conviction to the mind of every native.
L.S. ROWE, THE UNITED STATES AND PORTO Rico 14 (1904).
54. Id.
55. Ramos, supra note 15, at 19-20.
56. Id. at 20.
57. See id. at 20-21.
58. Id. at 20. The code followed the traditional distribution of subjects into categories of
persons, things, and actions as they appeared in the Justinian Institute of Roman law. This
scheme was developed in the Spanish Civil Code's use of four books: (1) persons; (2) property,
ownership, and its modifications; (3) different ways of acquiring ownership; and (4) obligations
and contracts. Id.
Initially, many changes were made in the text of the code in an attempt to incorporate
provisions of Lousiana's civil code. Id. The specific provisions imported from Louisiana were
taken from a code which pre-dated that of the Spanish code in place at the time of occupation.
Thus, most of the changes conflicted with traditional laws and mores on the island, and were
later abandoned. Id.
59. Id. at 21.
60. Id.
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of criminal procedure and its political (government) code, which the
Insular Assembly also adopted in 1902.61 The Insular Assembly
adopted the code of civil procedure of Idaho and the law of private
corporations of New Jersey in 1904 and 1911, respectively. 62
It is unclear whether these adoptions reflected the mainlanders'
belief that what worked at home was best, or whether they reflected
attempts to import familiar law from their own home states. Of
greater significance is the fact that Puerto Rico began its history of
United States governance by creating a legal system where elements of
both the common and civil law traditions existed in an uneasy, often
problematic juxtaposition.
B. Cutting and Pasting in Practice: Strict Products Liability and
Punitive Damages
The practice of doctrinal cutting and pasting, adopted by the In-
sular Assembly in the early twentieth century, was not limited to
codified law.63 In response to changing commercial, societal, and in-
dustrial conditions, common law courts on the mainland developed
new substantive law doctrines.64 Despite the limited discretion af-
forded judges in traditional civil law jurisdictions,65 Puerto Rican
courts continued the process of cutting and pasting by importing judi-
cial doctrines which logically conformed to the civil law tradition,
and rejecting those which did not. The adoption of strict products
liability and the rejection of punitive damages reflect this practice of
importation and rejection.
1. Importing Strict Products Liability
Puerto Rico has codified all obligations to others arising from
fault or negligence in Chapter 393 of the Civil Code, which provides
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. In civil law jurisdictions, prior judicial decisions do not carry nearly the same weight
as they do under the common law. Id. at 345-46; see infra text accompanying notes 71-73,
234-41. However, the acts imported from the mainland by the Insular Assembly, if not com-
plete by themselves, "were subject to the Anglo-American stare decisis of interpretation, a
technique in conflict with the civil law method." Id. at 22.
This created difficult questions regarding the weight to be given subsequent judicial deci-
sions from the jurisdiction which was the source of the act. See generally id. at 352-59.
64. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 139-40, 650-58 (4th
ed. 1971) (covering respectively the development of modem negligence doctrine and the move
from warranty to strict liability in products actions).
65. See infra text accompanying notes 239-41.
704 [Vol. 13:695
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in pertinent part: "A person who by an act or omission causes damage
to another through fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the
damage so done."
'66
The applicability of this statute to cases involving injuries to con-
sumers from defective products is problematic in two ways. First,
Puerto Rico's goal in imposing an extra-contractual obligation for
negligence is to compensate a victim for injuries sustained as a result
of the lack of foresight or prudence of the wrongdoer. 67 Under this
view, compensation for injuries is unavailable unless the consumer
can prove that the manufacturer did not exercise due diligence in the
manufacture of its product. 68 The doctrine of strict liability, or liabil-
ity without fault, is not a basis for redress, since it is incompatible
with a statutory scheme based upon fault.69
Second, the text of the statute allows little leeway for an interpre-
tation creating strict liability, and an unduly liberal construction
would run counter to Puerto Rico's civil law tradition. 70 In civil law
jurisdictions, the texts of written codes constitute the primary source
of the law. 7' Unlike the common law, the decisions of civil law judges
merely put a secondary gloss on the codes.72 Thus, civil law jurists
generally give great deference to both the text of codified statutes and
legislative intent.7 3
The first Puerto Rican courts to address the problem of con-
66. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 5141 (1968). This section is derived from the 1902 Civil
Code of Puerto Rico, section 1803, which, in turn, was derived from article 1902 of the Span-
ish Civil Code, originally extended to Puerto Rico in 1889. Id. (note on derivation); P.R.
LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 1 note on history (1967); see supra text accompanying notes 27, 58.
67. Graham v. Banco Territorial y Agricola, 5 P.R.R. 163 (1904). "[A] person who, by
an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged
to repair the damage done ...." Id. at 170.
68. W. PROSSER, supra note 64, at 642-44.
69. Id. at 492-96.
70. See generally Ramos, supra note 15, at 25-37.
71. Id. at 345.
72. Id. at 346.
73. See id. at 346-47. Given its anomalous status as a civil law jurisdiction in the com-
mon law United States, Puerto Rico is somewhat unique. According to Dean Rodriguez Ra-
mos, "[f]or the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico the written law is... a primary source of law.
Nearly always, the court has resorted in the first instance to written law, in search of a solution
for the problems brought before it." Id. at 365.
However, a diluted version of stare decisis, not found in most other civil law jurisdictions,
exists in Puerto Rico as well. See id. at 355, 361-64. Judicial decisions are taken into account
"only as instructive for a sound understanding and just application of the statutes." Sperl,
Case Law and the European Codified Law, 19 ILL. L. REV. 505, 519 (1925).
The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico does not consider itself bound by its own prior deci-
sions in a manner comparable to mainland tribunals. Rather, prior decisions only have a per-
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sumer injury from manufactured goods were confronted with a stat-
ute that provided little analytical opportunity for adopting a theory of
strict liability or products liability based on fault. However, products
liability in Puerto Rico developed in much the same way as it did on
the mainland.
74
In Castro v. Payco, Inc. ,7 the Puerto Rico Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of products liability. In that case, the plaintiff
purchased tainted ice cream directly from an employee of the manu-
facturer. 76  The court, in awarding compensatory damages to the
plaintiff, adopted a form of the implied warranty analysis which pre-
vailed on the mainland. 77 Unlike the mainland doctrine, which was
almost completely based on an extension of contract principles, the
court greatly supplemented its reasoning with negligence per se
principles.78
The Puerto Rican court did not, however, totally divorce the
warranty doctrine from its contractual underpinnings. In Castro, the
suasive effect on the court. Ramos, supra note 15, at 366. The high court's decisions, on the
other hand, strictly bind the insular district and municipal courts. Id.
Interestingly, the court considers itself bound by constructions of the Spanish Civil Code
rendered by the Supreme Court of Spain prior to October 18, 1898. Olivieri v. Biaggi, 17
P.R.R. 676 (1911); see also Marchan v. Eguen, 44 P.R.R. 396 (1933) (holding that when the
legislature adopted the Civil Code of Spain, it accepted the construction placed upon it by the
Spanish courts). Decisions rendered after that date are merely persuasive to the extent the
Puerto Rican high court agrees with the force of their reasoning. Olivieri, 17 P.R.R. at 676.
Thus, the court will frequently look to its own prior decisions and to those of the Spanish
Supreme Court in solving novel legal problems not addressed by statute.
The court may also refer to eminent Spanish commentators for the "proper" interpreta-
tion of those portions of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico literally copied from the Spanish Code.
Bonillerse v. Gonzalez, 17 P.R.R. 1084 (1911).
74. W. PROSSER, supra note 64, at 641-56.
75. 75 P.R.R. 59 (1953).
76. Id. at 61.
77. See W. PROSSER, supra note 64, at 650-56 for a discussion of the doctrine of implied
warranty.
78. Castro, 75 P.R.R. at 68. The court utilized the Puerto Rico Food, Drug and Cos-
metic Act, P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 24, §§ 711-32 (1979). The court noted:
Consequently, when the manufacturer of an article used for food offers it for sale for
human consumption, the presumption is that he has complied with the Act, that he
has placed on the market an unadulterated article and that he warrants that it is fit
for its intended use.
The majority of states in which this question has arisen, adhere to the rule of
implied warranty, that is, that the person who serves or sells food for human con-
sumption impliedly warrants that the product is wholesome and fit for human con-
sumption.... This doctrine is applicable in Puerto Rico according to the provisions
of Act No. 72 of 1940 mentioned above.
Castro, 75 P.R.R. at 68 (citation omitted).
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plaintiff purchased the ice cream directly from the manufacturer.79
Thus, privity of contract-a concept which later created problems on
the mainland 80-was established in Castro. However, the court also
laid the foundation for difficulties in applying the doctrine to a con-
sumer who purchased a defective product, but was separated from the
manufacturer by the chain of distribution."'
In Mendoza v. Cerveceria Corona, Inc. ,82 the court considered a
case that did not involve privity of contract. The plaintiff, after
purchasing a quantity of beer from a local warehouse and consuming
a bottle, became severely ill and was eventually hospitalized.83 In the
resulting action against the brewery, the court analyzed the main-
land's difficulties with the implied warranty doctrine's early require-
ment of privity of contract and its eventual adoption of strict
liability.8 4 The court then adopted a strict products liability formula-
tion for all manufacturers, which was similar to that set forth by the
California Supreme Court in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc. 85 and the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A.8 6
The Puerto Rican high court noted that "[tihere is nothing in
79. Castro, 75 P.R.R. at 61.
80. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
81. In Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Puerto Rico v. Negron Torres, 255 F.2d 149, 152 (1st Cir.
1958), the First Circuit interpreted Castro as establishing liability without requiring privity of
any sort.
[We feel justified in believing that the... Supreme Court of Puerto Rico...
[would] hold when the occasion arises that as to the wholesomeness of food the im-
plied warranty of fitness for human consumption is not grounded so much upon
contract as upon the strong public policy, as clearly expressed in the local pure food
and drug act, to preserve human health and even life itself.
Id.
82. 97 P.R.R. 487 (1969).
83. Id. at 487-88.
84. Id at 489-95.
85. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963).
86. See Mendoza, 97 P.R.R. at 499-500. Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 402A
provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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§ 1902 of the Spanish Civil Code... to prevent [the adoption of strict
liability]. "87 Rather, the court pointed out, the Spanish Supreme
Court was itself moving in the direction of objective or strict liabil-
ity.88 The court found further support for its move toward strict lia-
bility in Greenman: "The purpose of such liability is to insure that the
costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the
manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by
the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.18 9 Not-
ing that the adoption of strict liability did not force manufacturers to
be insurers of every injury caused by their products, 9° the court held
that "the strict liability rule being the most reasonable and being con-
sistent with the social needs of Puerto Rico and there being no provi-
sion in our code of laws militating against its adoption in our juridical
sphere, it is proper that we adopt it in this jurisdiction." 91
The Puerto Rico Supreme Court's importation of California
strict products liability doctrine continued in Montero Saldalia v.
American Motors Corp.,92 a case in which the court adopted the Cali-
fornia definition of "defect" as set forth in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson
Corp.93 In Saldaifa, the plaintiff suffered injuries when his vehicle's
87. Mendoza, 97 P.R.R. at 496.
88. Id. The court quoted from a 1963 Spanish Supreme Court case to support its
reasoning:
[a]lthough our legislation has not expressly admitted the objective liability sys-
tem, with respect to damages sustained by a third person, it is evident that both the
doctrine and the jurisprudence in an increasing evolution are to acknowledge liability
on the ground of the mere creation of perils for the community, even disregarding the
fault of the one liable ....
Id. at 496-97 (quoting Judgment of Oct. 30, 1963, Supreme Court of Spain, 32 Aranzadi,
Repertorio de Jurisprudencia 4231).
89. Mendoza, 97 P.R.R. at 499 (quoting Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc., 59 Cal.
2d 57, 63, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963)).
90. Mendoza, 97 P.R.R. at 499.
91. Id. at 500.
92. 107 D.P.R. 452 (1978).
93. Id. at 462 (quoting Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433,
501 P.2d 1153 (1972)). In Cronin, the defendant corporation in a products liability action
challenged a jury instruction which did not require the plaintiff to show that the defect found
in the product was "unreasonably dangerous," as set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 402A. Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d at 127-29, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 437-38, 501 P.2d at 1157-58. For
the text of section 402A, see supra note 86. The California Supreme Court, however, relying
on Greenman, concluded that requiring a plaintiff to prove not only that a product contained a
defect, but also that the defect made the product unreasonably dangerous to the consumer,
"would place a considerably greater burden upon him than that articulated in Greenman." Id.
at 134-35, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 443, 501 P.2d at 1163.
The Cronin court also eliminated any distinction between defects resulting from an error
in manufacturing and defects resulting from poor design:
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brakes failed. 94 Defendant American Motors asserted that it did not
own the factory which manufactured the vehicle. It further asserted
that the trial court had not interpreted the holding in Mendoza in
light of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
95
The Puerto Rico Supreme Court, however, held that the "defect
which afflicts a product does not have to be one which is 'unreasona-
bly dangerous to the consumer or purchaser' as expressed in Sec.
402A (1965) of the Restatement of Torts."96 For support, the court
relied on Mendoza dicta quoting an article by California Chief Justice
Traynor 97 and the California Supreme Court's decision in Cronin.98
As to the distinction between defects arising during production
and those arising during design, the court again followed Cronin, not-
ing that
[i]t is pertinent to make clear that the defect which gives rise
to the application of the doctrine of strict liability includes that
defect in manufacture as well as in design. "A defect may emerge
from the mind of the designer as well as from the hand of the
workman." 9 9
Thus, as shown in the area of strict products liability, the Puerto
Rico Supreme Court has essentially continued the process of import-
ing mainland law begun by the Insular Assembly at the turn of the
century. Its willingness to adopt the law of the mainland has not,
however, extended to the entire breadth of tort law. As this Coin-
We can see no difficulty in applying the Greenman formulation to the full range
of products liability situations, including those involving "design defects." A defect
may emerge from the mind of the designer as well as from the hand of the workman
... . Although it is easier to see the "defect" in a single, imperfectly fashioned
product than in an entire line badly conceived, a distinction between manufacture
and design defects is not tenable.
Id. at 134, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442-43, 501 P.2d at 1162-63.
94. Montero Saldatia, 107 D.P.R. at 455.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 461 (translation by author).
97. Mendoza v. Cerveceria Corona, Inc., 97 P.R.R. 487, 499 & n.7 (1969)(citing Traynor,
The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363
(1965)). In his article, Chief Justice Traynor suggested the following definition of "defect": "A
defective product may be defined as one that fails to match the average quality of like products,
and the manufacturer is then liable for injuries resulting from deviations from the norm."
Traynor, supra at 367.
98. Montero Salda~ia, 107 D.P.R. at 461-62 (citing Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.
3d 121, 134, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 443-44, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162-63 (1972)); see supra text accom-
panying note 93.
99. Montero Saldaa, 107 D.P.R. at 462 (quoting Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d at 134, 104 Cal. Rptr.
at 443-44, 501 P.2d at 1162-63) (those portions of Montero Saldada not quoting Cronin trans-
lated by author).
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ment will point out, the court has declined to adopt at least one com-
mon law doctrine in its courtrooms.
2. Rejecting Punitive Damages
Although the doctrine of punitive liability in civil actions has an-
cient roots, 1°° the common law doctrine originates from a 1763 Eng-
lish case, Huckle v. Money.' 10 By the turn of the twentieth century,
nearly every state in the union had accepted punitive civil liability.102
Puerto Rico's judiciary, however, has not opted to import this
doctrine. Rather, by adhering to the letter of the Puerto Rico Civil
Code, the island's courts limit damages to those necessary to compen-
sate the victim.' 0 3 Damages designed principally to punish or deter
conduct do not fit into this compensatory scheme and are therefore
not available. ,o4
As previously indicated, 105 Title 31, section 5141 of Puerto Rican
law'0 6 is the source for all actions brought in Puerto Rico for injuries
resulting from the negligent or wrongful act of another. 10 7 The sec-
tion uses broad language in specifying the available damages: "A per-
son who by an act or omission causes damage to another through
100. For an in-depth historical background of punitive damages both internationally and
in the United States, see Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L.
REV. 1258, 1262-64 & n.17 (1976).
101. 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763). In Huckle, the plaintiff sued the King's officers for
assault, trespass, and false imprisonment for actions under an illegal warrant. While the plain-
tiff was detained only six hours, and suffered slight physical damage, "exemplary damages"
were legitimately awarded because the illegal warrant was a "most daring public attack made
upon the liberty of the subject." Id. at 769.
102. Owen, supra note 100, at 1264 n.23. By 1935, all but four states (Louisiana, Massa-
chusetts, Nebraska, and Washington) had adopted some form of punitive damages. Id
103. See Computec Systems Corp. v. General Automation, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 819, 827
(D.P.R. 1984) (stating that "[u]nless the damage claimed is proven to have in fact existed and
to have been related to the injurious act, no compensation can be awarded .... ); see also
Jimenez Nieves v. United States, 618 F. Supp. 66, 69 (D.P.R. 1985) (stating that "the law of
torts in Puerto Rico has revolved around the central theme of compensation to the victim for
the damages he or she has suffered").
104. Cooperativa de Seguros Multiples de Puerto Rico v. San Juan, 289 F. Supp. 858, 859
(D.P.R. 1968) (stating that "damages to be awarded under the law of Puerto Rico should be of
a compensatory nature, to make the plaintiff whole for the damages and injuries suffered by
him, and not in the manner of a punishment").
105. See supra text accompanying note 66.
106. Prior to the codification in its current form, the text of Title 31, section 5141 was
found in section 1802 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico. See supra note 66 and accompanying
text. In cases predating the current codification, the supreme court refers to the section as it
was identified in the prior codification (§ 1802). To avoid confusion, this Comment has substi-
tuted, where possible, the section's location in the current codification.
107. Rivera v. Rossi, 64 P.R.R. 683, 689 (1945).
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fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done."10
The scheme of the section, however, is clearly compensatory in na-
ture. The Puerto Rican courts have expansively interpreted the sec-
tion as encompassing a broad range of injuries. 1°9
One of the principal Puerto Rican cases concerning the damages
available under Title 31, section 5141 is Rivera v. Rossi.10 In Rivera,
an action brought for a wrongful attachment of the plaintiff's auto-
mobile,' 1 the Puerto Rico Supreme Court expanded the availability
of damages for mental suffering while simultaneously stressing the
compensatory nature of the code section.
The court began by noting that it is inferred from the language of
Title 31, section 5141, and "is so held by the decisions and the text
writers, that in order to be compensable the damage must be the natu-
ral consequence of the fault or negligence of the person from whom
recovery is sought ... .-"112 In most prior Puerto Rican cases, awards
for mental suffering were limited to cases in which physical injury was
also present.' 
13
The Rivera court questioned the necessity and logic of this re-
quirement, asking, "is not a humiliation . . . more important than
many physical injuries for which compensation is usually and un-
hesitatingly awarded?"' 1 4 Although the Spanish Supreme Court had
108. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 5141 (1968) (reprinted in full at supra text accompanying
note 66).
109. See Ganapolsky v. Park Gardens Dev. Corp., 439 F.2d 844, 846 n.* (1st Cir. 1971).
110. 64 P.R.R. 683 (1945).
111. Id. at 684-85.
112. Id. at 689. Referring to the circumstances in which damages may be awarded under
the section, the court provided the following quote from a commentator on the Spanish Civil
Code:
As to the determination of the damage, the latter must be genuine and must not
flow from the fulfillment of the obligations, or from acts or omissions of the injured
person himself, and as to the proof of the fault or negligence, mere indications or
inadmissible presumptions are not sufficient to prove said fault or negligence; they
should be proved in such a manner as to leave no room to doubt their very existence
and their connection with the injury caused, for in order that fault or negligence may
become a source of obligation there must exist between them and the injury caused
the relation of cause and effect.
Id. at 690 (quoting Manresa, 12 COMMENTARIOS AL C6DIGO CIVIL ESPAROL 545 (4th ed.
1931)).
113. See id. at 687-89. The court also noted the common law majority view at that time,
which required accompanying physical damages for the recovery of mental suffering. Id. at
690. According to the court, the underlying theory is that a "physical impact" helps to guar-
antee that alleged mental suffering is genuine, thereby minimizing fraudulent claims. Id.; see
generally W. PROSSER, supra note 64, at 213-16 (common law adoption and eventual rejection
of physical impact rule).
114. Rivera, 64 P.R.R. at 689.
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not previously addressed the issue beyond awarding compensation for
damages to honor and family emotions,'1 5 the court noted that Title
31, section 5141 makes no distinction between damages to feelings
and physical damages with respect to compensation.' 16 Therefore,
the court saw "no reason whatsoever to restrict compensation for
damages to the feelings, to those cases where the honor and family
emotions are involved and to deny them in cases ... where ... it is
evident that a person of normal susceptibility must necessarily have
suffered mental anguish .... 1117
While expanding the availability of damages for mental suffer-
ing,11 8 the Rivera court expressly indicated that its broad interpreta-
tion of Title 31, section 5141 did not expand the recovery of damages
beyond those necessary to compensate the injured plaintiff: "The
award of damages.., is not a penalty imposed on the person who has
to pay them, but a compensation to the one who has sustained the
damages and, therefore, it is incumbent on the latter to prove the
existence of said damages in order to obtain the compensation."' 1 9
This declaration of the compensatory basis for tort damages in
Puerto Rico is the foundation for the general unavailability of puni-
tive damages in the commonwealth's subsequent case law.' 20 Accord-
ing to one commentator on the island's jurisprudence:
Puerto Rican case law has not yet admitted the theory of pu-
nitive damages adopted by Anglo-American Law. According to
that law, one may take into account not only the result produced
by the tort, the material and moral suffering of the victim, but also
the cause, that is, the conduct of the agent, in cases where such
conduct constitutes, besides a violation of a right, an outrage or an
insult. It seems that in Anglo-American Law, in which moral
damages are not admitted, such a theory is justified; that justifica-
tion does not exist in Puerto Rican Law.'
2'
115. Id. at 696-97.
116. Id. at 689.
117. Id. at 697.
118. Compagnie Nationale Air France v. Castano, 358 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1966); P.R.
LAWS ANN. tit. 31 § 5141 annot. 340 (1968).
119. Rivera, 64 P.R.R. at 686.
120. See Ganapolsky v. Park Gardens Dev. Corp., 439 F.2d 844, 846 n.* (1st Cir. 1971);
Pereira v. Int'l Basic Energy Corp., 95 P.R.R. 28, 54 (1967) (stating "in Puerto Rico the award
of punitive damages has not been authorized by law, and therefore, to award them is improper
.. "); Toro v. Porto Rican & Am. Ins. Co., 87 P.R.R. 625, 626 (1963).
121. VELAzQUEz, LAS OBLIGACIONES SEGON EL DERECHO PUERTORRIQUEFO 120
(1964), quoted in Cooperativa de Seguros Multiples de Puerto Rico v. San Juan, 289 F. Supp.
858, 860 (D.P.R. 1968).
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This general refusal to award punitive damages has also resulted
in excessive jury awards. In Carrasquillo v. Lippitt & Simonpietri,
Inc. ,122 the plaintiff, after being injured in an automobile accident, was
fraudulently induced into settling his claim for a small amount and
signing a form releasing the defendants from any future liability. 23
The trial court subsequently rendered a $10,000 judgment against the
defendants for their deceitful and fraudulent conduct. 24
On appeal, the defendants challenged the excessiveness of the
judgment as punitive in nature. 25 The Puerto Rico Supreme Court
agreed. In particular, the court pointed to the fact that the plaintiff
had not offered any proof at trial of the damages that resulted from
the alleged fraud. 126 The court therefore held that "the estimate of
said damages at $10,000 [was] so excessive that it should be consid-
ered of a punitive character,"' 27 which is not recognized in Puerto
Rico.
With such steadfast adherence to the compensatory nature of the
Puerto Rico Civil Code, the island's courts have refused to adopt one
of the more noteworthy aspects of the California tort system. This
rejection of punitive damages occurred despite the apparent willing-
ness of the Puerto Rican courts to adopt California's system of strict
products liability. After discussing the development of punitive liabil-
ity in California, this Comment will consider some of the possible rea-
sons for, and ultimately the wisdom behind, Puerto Rico's rejection of
the doctrine.
III. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN CALIFORNIA PRODUCTS LIABILITY
ACTIONS
California courts have been in the forefront of the development
of the common law of torts in the United States with respect to the
duties citizens owe one another, 28 the causes of action generally
available to plaintiffs, 29 and the potential damages available to pre-
122. 98 P.R.R. 646 (1970).
123. Id. at 647-48.
124. Id. at 649.
125. See id. at 649.
126. Id. at 657.
127. Carrasquillo, 98 P.R.R. at 657.
128. See generally Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561
(1968) (repudiating common law classifications between landowners and the duties they owe to
others); Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334
(1976) (psychotherapist's affirmative duty to warn third party endangered by patient).
129. See generally Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 44 P.2d 912 (1968)
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vailing parties.130 Consistent with California's trend toward plaintiff-
oriented tort law is the availability of punitive damages in products
liability actions. Before discussing the applicability of punitive dam-
ages in the products liability context, it is helpful to understand how
the doctrine of punitive damages developed in the state and how the
courts apply it to tort actions in general.
A. Punitive Damages in California
The California legislature and courts have made punitive dam-
ages available for nearly as long as the state has existed.1 3' As ex-
plained below, the interaction between the punitive damage statutes
and judicial interpretation has guided the development of the various
requirements necessary for a jury to award exemplary damages.
1. Statutory Authority and Legislative History
The recovery of punitive damages in civil actions in California
derives from section 3294 of the Civil Code. 32 As originally worded,
this section required the plaintiff to prove that the defendant acted
(establishing broad rule of liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress); Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963) (establishing
strict liability for manufacturers of goods).
130. See generally American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 182, 578 P.2d 899 (1978) (adopting doctrine of comparative partial indemnity).
131. The section of the Civil Code providing for exemplary damages was enacted in 1872.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1970). California was admitted to the union in 1850. CALI-
FORNIA JOURNAL, ALMANAC OF CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 1983-84 (4th ed.
1983).
132. Section 3294 provides:
(a) In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where
it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of
oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may
recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.
(b) An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a),
based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer has advance
knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a con-
scious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful
conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression,
fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and
conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice
must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.
(c) As used in this section, the following definitions shall apply:
(1) "Malice" means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury
to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a
willful and conscious disregard of rights or safety of others.
(2) "Oppression" means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and
unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.
(3) "Fraud" means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of
a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defend-
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with oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed, in order for a
jury to award punitive damages. 133 As amended in 1905,134 this sec-
tion allowed the recovery of punitive damages, when "the defendant
[had] been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied
"135
The most significant difference between the code section as origi-
nally enacted and as it existed for some seventy-five years after the
1905 amendment was the two words qualifying the term "malice."
Although there appears to be little semantic difference between the
terms "actual and presumed" and "express or implied," the issue of
what constituted the necessary element of malice, and how malice
could be proved, made up the substantial portion of California case
law on punitive damages.
In 1980, the state legislature discarded the distinction by deleting
the words "express and implied," and redefined malice as "conduct
which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or
conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a conscious disre-
gard of the rights or safety of others."' 136 These changes represented
an effort to limit what the legislature, government entities, and many
business interests considered an uncontrolled deluge of punitive dam-
age awards. 137 Apparently, little of the expected relief materialized,
and these same special interest groups turned again to Sacramento in
1987. These groups and the plaintiff's bar, represented by the Califor-
nia Trial Lawyers Association, struck an old-fashioned back-room
political deal. The latter promised a greater measure of relief for busi-
ness interests in return for a promise not to pursue serious tort reform
until 1992.138
Among other tort reform measures, the Brown-Lockyer Civil Li-
ability Reform Act of 1987139 affected punitive damages by requiring
plaintiffs to prove oppression, fraud, or malice by "clear and convinc-
ant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing
injury.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1991).
133. 2 Civ. CODE OF CAL. § 3294 (C. Haymond & J. Burch, Cal. Code Comm'rs) (Ist ed.
1872).
134. 1905 Cal. Stat. 621.
135. CAL. CiV. CODE § 3294 (West 1970).
136. 1980 Cal. Stat. 4217-18.
137. See Brady, Welcome News From California: Lessening the Conflict Between Insurer
and Insured, 29 FOR THE DEFENSE, Dec. 1987, at 13.
138. Id.
139. 1987 Cal. Stat. 1, ch. 1498.
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ing evidence."' 4° The Act redefined oppression as "despicable con-
duct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious
disregard of that person's rights,"141 and malice as "conduct ... in-
tended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable
conduct... carried on... with a willful and conscious disregard of
the rights or safety of others."
142
The legislature effected these statutory modifications in an effort
to limit the expansion of punitive damage awards.143 This represents
the current statutory framework for the doctrine of punitive damages
in California. More relevant to this Comment, however, are the ac-
tions taken by the California courts in the intervening years (1905-
1980) which resulted in these dramatic statutory responses.
2. Judicial Changes in the Doctrine
Judicial recognition of punitive damages in California actually
predated the adoption of Civil Code section 3294. In Wilson v. Mid-
dleton, 144 the California Supreme Court allowed punitive damages in
an action for malicious assault. 145 This decision immediately followed
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Day v. Woodworth 146 in
which the Court held that the challenges to the propriety of the doc-
trine would "not admit of argument."'
147
The enactment of Civil Code section 3294, therefore, merely rati-
fied judicial acceptance of the doctrine both inside and outside of the
state.' 48 With the adoption of section 3294, however, California
courts had statutory guidance for awarding punitive damages. Yet,
140. Id. § 5. Until this modification, malice, oppression, or fraud sufficient to justify an
award could be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Brady, supra note 137, at 16.
141. 1987 Cal. Stat. 1, ch. 1498, sec. 5.
142. Id.
143. Brady, supra note 137, at 16-17.
144. 2 Cal. 54 (1852). Other cases decided prior to 1872 allowing punitive damages in-
clude Mendelsohn v. Anaheim Lighter Co., 40 Cal. 657 (1871); Nightingale v. Scannell, 18
Cal. 315 (1861); and Dorsey v. Manlove, 14 Cal. 553, 556 (1860).
Where the trespass is committed from wanton or malicious motives, or a reckless
disregard of the rights of others, or under circumstances of great hardship or oppres-
sion, the rule of compensation is not adhered to .... In these cases the jury are [sic]
not confined to the loss or injury sustained, but may go further and award punitive or
exemplary damages, as a punishment for the act, or as a warning to others.
Id
145. Wilson, 2 Cal. at 56.
146. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851).
147. Id. at 371.
148. See Note, Punitive Damages in California under the Malice Standard: Defining Con-
scious Disregard, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 1065 (1984).
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the courts still had to develop standards for the rather ambiguous and
underdefined statutory prerequisites of malice.
In Davis v. Hearst, 149 the California Supreme Court set forth the
first widely-accepted definitions of malice under section 3294. In a
libel action against William Randolph Hearst and one of his newspa-
pers, a Pasadena School Board member sought compensatory and pu-
nitive damages for a series of newspaper articles on local
government.150 Faced with the two types of malice involved in libel
actions-that malice required to prove libel itself and that which must
be shown to recover punitive damages-the court laid down a worka-
ble distinction between constructive and actual malice.151
To recover compensatory damages under Davis, a plaintiff must
only prove constructive malice or malice presumed by law from a de-
fendant's defamatory and unprivileged communication. 52 However,
in order to recover punitive damages, a plaintiff must prove malice in
fact, or an actual, subjective malicious intent on the part of the
defendant.
It should be apparent that the malice, and the only malice, contem-
plated by section 3294 is malice in fact .... [I]t is only upon some
showing regarded by the law as adequate to establish the presence
of malice in fact, that is the motive and willingness to vex, harass,
annoy, or injure, that punitive damages have ever been awarded. 1'3
The Davis definition of malice remains one of the bases for the
recovery of punitive damages in California. 5 4 This would present few
problems if recovery was limited to actions for libel and other inten-
tional torts, where animus malus, if not necessary, is relatively easy to
prove. However, section 3294, even as amended in 1987, does not
restrict the recovery of punitive damages to such cases. 1 5 Despite
this fact, a number of California courts for some time both expressly
and impliedly adhered to the animus malus or evil motive standard
set down in Davis.'5 6
149. 160 Cal. 143 (1911).
150. Id. at 149-54. The newspaper implicated was the Los Angeles Examiner. Id. at 149.
151. Id. at 156-58.
152. Wilson v. Fitch, 41 Cal. 363 (1871).
153. Davis, 160 Cal. at 162.
154. 6 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 1325, at 793 (9th ed. 1988).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 140-42. For the complete current text of section
3294, see supra note 132.
156. For a lengthy list of decisions, see G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App.
3d 22, 30 n.2, 122 Cal. Rptr. 212, 223 (1975).
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The Davis rule therefore created an almost insurmountable ob-
stacle in actions based on civil liability which were arguably within
the scope of section 3294, but did not rise to the level of intentional
tort. 157 The difficulties created by Davis in nonintentional tort cases
led a number of California courts to develop explications of malice
which would extend the punitive damage doctrine without rejecting
the venerable Davis analysis. One line of cases cast malice in terms of
wanton and reckless misconduct, 58 while other cases employed the
term recklessness in conjunction with other disparaging terms, such
as wantonness, willfulness, intent, and conscious disregard of dan-
ger.' 59 Still other cases utilized reckless misconduct and reckless dis-
regard as terms with an independent capacity to sustain punitive
damage awards. 16 According to one court, the later cases in this
group merely "assume, without analysis, that reckless disregard of the
consequences completely satisfies the statutory concept of malice.' 16 '
In the mid-1970s, these judicial variations on the meaning of
malice ended with two decisions. In Silberg v. California Life Ins.
Co., 162 an insurance bad faith case, the California Supreme Court held
that "[i]n order to justify an award of exemplary damages, the defend-
ant must be guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294.)
He must act with the intent to vex, injure or annoy, or with a con-
scious disregard of the plaintiff's rights."'
63
This "conscious disregard" approach was adapted to the prod-
157. For example, in a typical products liability action, the plaintiff rarely can prove that a
manufacturer actually harbored a subjective intent to injure, vex, harass, or annoy, a specific
consumer or even the consuming public as a whole.
158. See Donnelly v. Southern Pacific Co., 18 Cal. 2d 863, 869-70, 118 P.2d 465, 468-69
(1941).
159. See Schroeder v. Auto Driveway Co., 11 Cal. 3d 908, 922, 114 Cal. Rptr. 622, 631,
523 P.2d 662, 671 (1974); Ebaugh v. Rabkin, 22 Cal. App. 3d 891, 895-96, 99 Cal. Rptr. 706,
709 (1972); Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 362, 369, 72 Cal. Rptr. 157,
162 (1968); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 713, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398,
415 (1967); Cohen v. Groman Mortuary, Inc., 231 Cal. App. 2d 1, 9, 41 Cal. Rptr. 481, 486
(1964); Roth v. Shell Oil Co., 185 Cal. App. 2d 676, 682, 8 Cal. Rptr. 514, 517 (1960); Gombos
v. Ashe, 158 Cal. App. 2d 517, 526-30, 322 P.2d 933 (1958); see generally Franson, Exemplary
Damages in Vehicle Accident Cases, 50 CAL. ST. B.J. 93 (1975).
160. See Templeton Feed & Grain v. Ralston Purina Co., 69 Cal. 2d 461, 471, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 344, 350, 446 P.2d 152, 158 (1968); Dorsey v. Manlove, 14 Cal. 553, 556 (1860); Sturges
v. Charles L. Harney, Inc., 165 Cal. App. 2d 306, 322, 331 P.2d 1072, 1081 (1958); McDonell
v. American Trust Co., 130 Cal. App. 2d 296, 299, 279 P.2d 138, 140-41 (1955).
161. Searle, 49 Cal. App. at 31, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 224.
162. 11 Cal. 3d 452, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711, 521 P.2d 1103 (1974).
163. Id. at 462, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 718, 521 P.2d at 1110.
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ucts liability context in G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court.'6 4 In
Searle, the plaintiff sued Searle, a drug manufacturer, alleging injury
from the use of an oral contraceptive. The plaintiff sought both gen-
eral and punitive damages. 165  Searle filed a demurrer attacking,
among other things, the sufficiency of the plaintiff's punitive damages
claim.' 66 After a detailed analysis of relevant precedent, the court
concluded that the shifts in the definition of malice reflected "judicial
restlessness with the Davis v. Hearst formula."' 67 In particular, the
court noted that "[v]erbalisms coined in a libel action may seem un-
suitable for a products liability suit involving claims of commercial
callousness .... "168
Determining that "suits of the present variety call for a restate-
ment of the traditional concept,"' 69 the Searle court put forth its own
suggestion. In reliance on the California Supreme Court's language in
Silberg, the court reasoned that "[iln a personal injury action the no-
tion of conscious disregard of the safety of others logically may be
substituted for that of disregard of the rights of others."' 70 The court
then suggested "conscious disregard of safety as an appropriate de-
scription of the animus malus which may justify an exemplary dam-
age award when nondeliberate injury is alleged."' 7'
The "conscious disregard of safety" standard has been followed
in virtually every nonintentional injury case in which punitive dam-
ages have been awarded under the malice standard. 72 As indicated
above, this standard was incorporated in the definition of malice in
the 1980 amendments to section 3294.173 With the new 1987 amend-
ments to section 3294, and the requirement of "despicable" con-
duct,174 however, it remains to be seen how the courts will maneuver
within these tighter guidelines. With this legal background on the
164. 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975).
165. Id. at 25, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 32, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 224.
168. Id., 122 Cal. Rptr. at 224-25.
169. Searle, 49 Cal. App. 3d at 32, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Note, supra note 148, at 1075. In Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 693, 598 P.2d 854 (1979), the California Supreme Court sanctioned the "conscious disre-
gard" standard. The court concurred with the Searle observation that "a conscious disregard
of the safety of others may constitute malice within the meaning of section 3294 of the Civil
Code." Id. at 895, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 696, 598 P.2d at 856.
173. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
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development of the doctrine of punitive damages in California now
complete, this Comment will examine its specific application in the
products liability context.
B. Punitive Damages in Products Liability Actions
The prevalence of punitive damage awards in California and the
rest of the nation gives few courts or commentators pause to question
their availability in actions based on fraud or deceit, at least when the
plaintiff satisfies the jurisdiction's pleading requirements.17 5 How-
ever, with respect to implied warranty and strict liability actions,
many have raised vociferous complaints about the logical, economic,
and equitable propriety of this type of damages. 7 6
1. The Case Against Punitive Damages: Roginsky v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc.
Early decisions in this country reflected judicial discomfort with
applying the traditional punitive damages doctrine to actions based on
strict liability, where the question of fault is irrelevant. As a result,
most of the early cases resulted in favorable decisions for manufactur-
ers challenging the availability of punitive damages in products liabil-
ity actions.
Representative of this trend was Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc.,177 a New York case in which the plaintiff sued the manufacturer
of a prescription drug which was designed to lower blood cholesterol,
but which caused users throughout the country to develop cataracts.
The case provides a cogent, in-depth analysis of the inherent problems
in reconciling the strict liability and punitive damages doctrines.
In Roginsky, the jury awarded the plaintiff $100,000 in punitive
damages. 178 On appeal, the Second Circuit found the evidence insuffi-
cient to sustain the award and overturned it.' T7 In dicta, Judge
Friendly, writing for the majority, criticized the general advisability
of punitive damages in products liability actions and raised three im-
portant points.
First, if multiple plaintiffs, each affected by the same defect in a
widely-marketed product, recovered punitive damages in the amount
175. Owen, supra note 100, at 1268.
176. See id. at 1268-77.
177. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied, 378 F.2d 832, 851 (1967).
178. Id. at 834.
179. Id. at 835.
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awarded to Mr. Roginsky, total liability "would run into tens of mil-
lions [of dollars], as contrasted with the maximum criminal penalty of
•. . 'not more than $10,000.. .', 21 U.S.C. § 333(b), for each violation
of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act with intent to defraud or mis-
lead." 80 Thus, a manufacturer's aggregate punitive liability could
well exceed the maximum allowable criminal penalty, even to the
point of bankrupting an otherwise honest and socially beneficial
manufacturer. 181
This possibility additionally raises concerns about the denial of
the manufacturer's right to due process, 8 2 as the rules of civil proce-
dure are generally less stringent than constitutionally-mandated crim-
inal safeguards.8 3 Further, even if punitive damages are limited to
first-time plaintiffs, a practical and equitable issue arises as to who
should draw the line separating first-comers, and when and where the
line should be drawn. 84
Second, the majority opinion raises the fear that manufacturers
could escape the punitive effects of exemplary damages by obtaining
products liability insurance. 8 While Judge Friendly ignores the po-
tential unconscionability of indemnity for intentional conduct, he
cites the detrimental effect such insurance would have on insurance
rates for the public as a whole.18 6
Finally, the opinion points out that the financial burden of a pu-
nitive award would not actually be borne by the offending actors.
Rather, the court notes that "a sufficiently egregious error as to one
product can end the business life of a concern.., with many innocent
stockholders suffering extinction of their investments for a single
management sin."'
87
180. Id. at 839.
181. Id. at 841.
182. Roginsky, 378 F.2d at 839-40.
183. For example, in civil cases the standard of proof is generally a preponderance of the
evidence, while in criminal trials in the United States, the Constitution has been interpreted to
require the much heavier burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358 (1970).
184. See Roginsky, 378 F.2d at 839-40. The court noted that most juries and a number of
judges would have some difficulty in understanding why plaintiffs in equally meritorious cases
throughout the country should get fewer or no punitive damages, simply because other plain-
tiffs fortuitously arrived first and stripped the cupboard bare. Id.
185. Id. at 841.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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2. The Judicial Response in California: Toole v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc.
Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 88 a case decided almost three
months after Roginsky, involved the same defective drug, the same
defendant, an almost identically-situated plaintiff, and virtually the
same set of facts. However, the California Court of Appeal largely
ignored, if not implicitly repudiated, the concerns raised by the Sec-
ond Circuit. The Toole court disagreed with the Roginsky court's
holding as to the sufficiency of evidence for an award of punitive dam-
ages, noting that it saw in its "record ample evidence of conduct on
the part of appellant from which the jury could infer intentional, wil-
ful and reckless conduct on appellant's part, done in disregard of pos-
sible injury to persons such as respondent."'' 8 9
Setting aside evidentiary issues, these two decisions represent a
deep difference of opinion on the general advisability of punitive dam-
ages in products liability actions. The Second Circuit in Roginsky be-
lieved that a number of public policy concerns warranted caution in
awarding punitive damages.' 9° The court of appeal in Toole, how-
ever, demonstrated no such caution. It apparently failed to consider
important concerns regarding who eventually must bear the burden of
these damages and what effect insuring against them might have on
consumers at large.' 9'
In its petition for rehearing, Richardson-Merrell argued again
that punitive damages are unconstitutional given the lack of a stan-
dard to measure the punishment and the lack of a limit on the amount
to be awarded. 192 The court of appeal found no merit whatsoever in
this contention. 93 Thus, the court implicitly repudiated all three of
Judge Friendly's arguments in Roginsky. 194
188. 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, reh'g denied, 251 Cal. App. 2d 718 (1967).
189. Id. at 715 n.3, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 180-87.
191. The court explicitly rejected Richardson-Merrell's constitutional challenge to the
awarding of punitive damages and thereby implicitly rejected the Second Circuit's similar ar-
gument in Roginsky. See Toole, 251 Cal. App. 2d at 716-17, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 417-18. As to the
insurability against punitive damages, California courts have subsequently held such insurance
contracts void as against public policy. Ford Motor Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 116 Cal. App. 3d
374, 172 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1981).
192. Id. at 719, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 419.
193. Id.
194. As to the arguments regarding innocent shareholders and the availability of insur-
ance, if there is no merit in the contention as to what effect huge punitive damage awards
might have, it follows there is no need to worry about who eventually pays these awards. As to
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In its decision, the Toole court further stated that "a plaintiff's
right to exemplary or punitive damages, when the defendant's con-
duct justifies the award, is generally accepted, and may exist even in
the absence of statute. Some authorities have said that the right to
such damages is as old as the right to trial by jury.'1 95
The court's language implies that punitive damages serve a re-
tributional function and are thereby a right of litigants who success-
fully prove that they have been sufficiently wronged. The court does
not give consideration to the effect of punitive damages on future
business conduct or the public at large.
A less radical interpretation might be that given the enormous
cost of prosecuting products liability actions, the successful litigant
should reap the reward for his or her initiative. This interpretation,
however, is unfounded, since the court does not limit its comment to
products liability actions. Therefore the court's comments could be
applied to any more-easily-prosecuted action in which punitive dam-
ages are sought.
With either interpretation, the Toole court certainly broke new
ground in awarding punitive damages.196 Building on the court's
comment that the right to punitive damages may exist even in the
absence of statute, other California courts have clearly adopted their
own views as to the availability of punitive damages in products liabil-
ity actions. 1
9 7
3. Post-Toole Reprise in California
The general availability of punitive damages in California prod-
ucts liability actions was elaborately explained and solidified in Grim-
shaw v. Ford Motor Co., 198 the infamous "Pinto" litigation.
In Grimshaw, the plaintiffs sued the Ford Motor Company for
injuries sustained when the Ford Pinto in which they had been travel-
ing exploded after a rear-end collision. 99 According to facts elicited
at trial, Ford management was aware that the Pinto could not survive
the constitutional challenge itself, the court's view of Judge Friendly's contention is self-ex-
planatory. See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 180-87.
195. Toole, 251 Cal. App. 2d at 719, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 419 (emphasis added).
196. Since the California Supreme Court refused to review Toole, Roginsky has little, if
any, persuasive authority.
197. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 358
(1981); G.D. Searle & Co., 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975).
198. 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981).
199. Id. at 771, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
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a twenty mile per hour rear-end collision without significant fuel spill-
age.200 Ford, however, decided to produce the subcompact without
implementing recommended changes in the vehicle's design. 20 1 These
recommendations originated from Ford's own engineers and would
have achieved fuel system integrity at relatively little cost.
20 2
Following a six-month jury trial, plaintiff Grimshaw, the only
occupant who survived the explosion, was awarded $2.5 million in
compensatory damages and $125 million in punitive damages. 20 3 On
appeal, Ford contended that punitive damages were statutorily imper-
missible in a design defect case and that there was no evidentiary sup-
port for a finding of malice or corporate responsibility for malice.
2 °4
In particular, Ford asserted that the "malice" required by Civil
Code section 3294 necessitated evidence of animus malus-an inten-
tion to injure the person harmed.20 5 This essentially restated the Da-
vis definition of malice, 2°6 which Ford contended was "conceptually
incompatible with an unintentional tort such as the manufacture and
marketing of a defectively designed product.
'20 7
The court of appeal rejoined that Ford's contention ran counter
to the state's case law on the definition of malice. 20 8 The court
pointed out that malice not only includes a malicious intention to in-
jure the specific person harmed, but also "conduct evincing 'a con-
scious disregard of the probability that the actor's conduct will result
in injury to others.' ",209
The court continued:
The interpretation of the word "malice" . . . to encompass
conduct evincing callous and conscious disregard of public safety
by those who manufacture and market mass produced articles is
200. Id. at 775-77, 174 Cal. Rptr. 360-62.
201. Id. at 776, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
202. Id. at 775-76, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 360-61.
203. Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 771, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 358. On Ford's motion for a
new trial, Grimshaw was required to remit all but $3.5 million of the punitive damages as a
condition of denial of the motion. Id. at 772, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 358. Plaintiff Gray, who was
the driver of the vehicle, suffered fatal burns as a result of the accident. Her estate was
awarded $559,680 in compensatory damages in a consolidated wrongful death action. Id. at
771-72 & n.1, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
204. Id. at 807, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
205. Id. at 808, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
206. See supra text accompanying note 153.
207. Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 808, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 162-73.
209. Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 808, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 381 (quoting Dawes v. Superior
Court, 111 Cal. App. 3d 82, 88, 168 Cal. Rptr. 319, 322 (1980)).
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consonant with and furthers the objectives of punitive dam-
ages[,]. . punishment and deterrence of like conduct by the
wrongdoer and others.... In the traditional noncommercial inten-
tional tort, compensatory damages alone may serve as an effective
deterrent against future wrongful conduct but in commerce-related
torts, the manufacturer may find it more profitable to treat com-
pensatory damages as part of the cost of doing business rather than
to remedy the defect .... Deterrence of such "objectionable corpo-
rate policies" serves one of the principal purposes of Civil Code
section 3294.... Punitive damages thus remain as the most effec-
tive remedy for consumer protection against defectively designed
mass produced articles.
210
The court treated with equal contempt Ford's contention that
the evidence at trial was insufficient to support a finding of malice or
corporate responsibility for such malice.2 1' According to the court,
Ford knew, through the results of its own crash tests, that its custom-
ers risked serious injury or death in a twenty to thirty mile per hour
collision.212 Further, "[tihere was evidence that Ford could have cor-
rected the hazardous design defects at minimal cost .... ,,213 Ford,
however, "decided to defer correction of the shortcomings by engag-
ing in a cost-benefit analysis balancing human lives and limbs against
corporate profits. 214 In the court's view, "Ford's institutional
mentality was shown to be one of callous indifference to public
safety[,]"' 21 and therefore, "[tihere was substantial evidence that
Ford's conduct constituted 'conscious disregard' of the probability of
injury to members of the consuming public." 21 6
Ford's claim that the evidence was insufficient to support a find-
ing of corporate ratification of the malicious misconduct was equally
without merit.2 1 7 The court first recited California law on the puni-
tive liability of corporations for employee actions.218 It then held that
the malicious conduct at issue was either perpetrated by managerial
employees of Ford acting within the scope of their authority, or rati-
210. Id. at 810, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 382-83 (citations omitted).
211. Id. at 813, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 813, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. California follows the Restatement rule that punitive damages can be awarded
against a principal because of an agent's action if, but only if,
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fled or approved by Ford or its managerial agents. 219
In particular, the court noted that Ford management was aware
of the results of the crash tests prior to the decision to go forward
with production. 220 Testimony indicated that these results were for-
warded up the chain of command to the committee that made the
final decision.221 The court summed up the testimony by noting that
[w]hile much of the evidence was necessarily circumstantial,
there was substantial evidence from which the jury could reason-
ably find that Ford's management decided to proceed with the pro-
duction of the Pinto with knowledge of test results revealing design
defects which rendered the fuel tank extremely vulnerable on rear
impact at low speeds and endangered the safety and lives of the
occupants. Such conduct constitutes corporate malice. 222
In terms of basic fairness, the California court of appeal's deci-
sion in Grimshaw appears correct, given Ford's callous manufacturing
decisions. Indeed, the facts of the case possibly make the strongest
argument for awarding punitive damages in products liability actions.
Hopefully, however, the decisions of Ford at issue in Grimshaw repre-
sent an anomaly in the larger scheme of business affecting the state's
residents. A question arises, therefore, whether Grimshaw should ap-
ply equally to cases in which the manufacturer's intent is ambiguous
or does not rise to a Grimshaw level of callousness. At some point,
(a) the principal authorized the doing and the manner of the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in employing him, or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope
of employment, or
(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or approved the
act.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973); see also Hart v. Na-
tional Mortgage & Land Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 1420, 1432, 235 Cal. Rptr. 68, 76 (1987);
Pusateri v. E. F. Hutton & Co., 180 Cal. App. 3d 247, 250, 225 Cal. Rptr. 526, 527 (1986);
Greenfield v. Spectrum Investment Corp., 174 Cal. App. 3d 111, 118, 219 Cal. Rptr. 805, 809
(1985); Grieves v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. App. 3d 159, 167, 203 Cal. Rptr. 556, 561 (1984);
Chodos v. Ins. Co. of North Am., 126 Cal. App. 3d 86, 102, 178 Cal. Rptr. 831, 840 (1981);
Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 822-32, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482, 489, 598 P.2d
452, 458-59 (1979); Merlo v. Standard Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 59 Cal. App. 3d 5, 18, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 416, 424-25 (1976); Hale v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 42 Cal. App. 3d 681, 691-92, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 146, 153-54 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, 24 Cal. 3d 809, 822 n.5 (1979). For statutory
requirements for the awarding of punitive damages against a corporate employer, see CAL.
CIV. CODE § 3294(b) (West Supp. 1990) (reprinted in full supra note 132).
219. Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 813, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
220. Id. at 814, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
221. Id.
222. Id.
726 [Vol. 13:695
Punitive Damages in Products Liability Actions
cost-benefit analysis can justifiably determine appropriate standards
for a product while still rendering it affordable to the consumer.
If Ford's behavior in Grimshaw and Richardson-Merrel's behav-
ior in Toole are anomalies, should the courts derive a rule which will
expand punitive liability to innocent or commercially and socially-
reasonable manufacturing decisions? The California judiciary has
done just that. As a result, a manufacturer could face punitive liabil-
ity solely for placing its product on the market, regardless of its intent
in developing or marketing the product.
The sections that follow compare the logic behind codification
and liability in both Puerto Rico and California, and recommend a
solution to minimize the criminal type of behavior evident in Grim-
shaw, and dismantle what has become strict punitive liability for man-
ufacturers in California.
IV. DISCUSSION: DISTINCTIONS AND PROBLEMS
As previously indicated, 223 Puerto Rico and California have
reached opposite conclusions on the availability of punitive damages
in products liability actions. In large measure, this results from the
jurisdictions' divergent views on civil liability.
Puerto Rico adheres to the compensatory nature of civil liability
and has prohibited the advent of punitive liability on the island. 224
On the other hand, California's legislature and courts have allowed
juries to consider not only the victim's injuries, but also the wrong-
doer's actions, in assessing liability. 225
What differences in the structure of the two legal systems ac-
count for these contrasting views on the nature of liability? What
problems have arisen in the products liability context in California as
a result of its view? These are the questions that the following two
sections address.
A. Codification
In outlining and implementing their views on civil liability, Pu-
erto Rico and California have utilized similar procedures. Their ad-
mittedly divergent views on liability are based on their respective Civil
Codes.226 Judicial bodies in both jurisdictions have interpreted the
223. See supra text accompanying notes 103-27, 188-222.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 103-27.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 131-74,
226. For Puerto Rico, see P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 5141 (1968) (reprinted in pertinent
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sections to give them their respective meanings.227 Here, however, the
similarities end. What these civil codes represent, how they are struc-
tured, and how they are interpreted in some measure accounts for
their differing views on civil liability.
Virtually all modem jurisdictions which adhere to the civil law
tradition base their judicial institutions on codified law.228 The per-
ception "that civil law systems are codified statutory systems, whereas
the common law is uncodified and is... large[ly] judicial" is often
used to describe the differences between the civil and common law
traditions. 229 But this is both an oversimplification and a misstate-
ment. In fact, California, which is not a civil law jurisdiction, has
more codes than any civil law nation,230 and until recently some civil
law countries remained uncodified. 231
Ultimately, it is what the codifications 232 represent, and how they
are structured, that account for some of the real differences between
the civil and common law traditions, including their dissimilar views
on punitive damages.
1. The Theory Behind Codification
a. Puerto Rico
In civil law jurisdictions like Puerto Rico, codification is not
merely a political endorsement of previous law.233 Rather, codifica-
tion entails the "logical and methodical ordering of rules of law which
are the product of reason, and not a gift from history, in one body...
known as a code."' 234 Historically, codification has often resulted
from various utopian efforts to unify and simplify the law, in such a
part supra text accompanying note 66). For California, see CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West
Supp. 1990) (reprinted in full supra note 132).
227. See supra text accompanying notes 103-127, 144-74.
228. J.H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION-AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 26 (2d ed. 1985).
229. See id.
230. Id. California has twenty-eight separate codes. CAL. CIV. CODE vol. 6 (§§ 1-653), at
IX (1982).
231. J.H. MERRYMAN, supra note 228, at 26. For example, Hungarian civil law was codi-
fied after World War II, when Hungary became a socialist state. Greece also enacted its first
civil code after World War II. South Africa, whose judicial institutions are based on Roman-
Dutch law, remains uncodified. Id.
232. "Codification" refers to the preparation of a written work which is intended to au-
thoritatively set out the basic principles and rules of a broad field of law. A. WATSON, THE
MAKING OF THE CIVIL LAW 100 (1981).
233. Ramos, supra note 15, at 30.
234. Id.
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way as to bring order and predictability to the legal system.235
Codifications are more than mere compilations of statutes. They
provide comprehensive expressions of national ideology.236 First,
they can signify the complete repudiation of prior law and the accom-
panying adoption of new law. 237 In this sense, any principles of pre-
existing law that are incorporated into new codes derive their validity
from this "rebirth," and not from any prior existence or value.238
Second, codifications embody the concept of political separation
of powers, where the judge is "bound to 'find' the law implicit in the
statutes, never to invent a law theretofore non-existent. ' 239 From this
perspective, judicial decisions are merely "an echo of the statutory
will; not declarations of the judge's own legal will." 24° They are "[i]n
short an application, not a creation, of law."
'241
Finally, codification represents an effort to simplify the law,
make it accessible to average citizens, and allow them to determine
their legal rights and obligations without the aid of attorneys,
242
courts, or volumes of caselaw. 243 One commentator provides an ex-
cellent statement of this populist ideology:
[W]ritten codes are not accessible to jurists alone, nor even
primarily intended for them, but for everybody; on the other hand,
a library of case reports, text-books, commentaries, or encyclope-
dias is for lawyers only.... Law is no esoteric science that must be
discovered through learned work from thousands of precedents,
235. Spain codified in an attempt to effect legal unity in the aftermath of the Moorish
invasion and the nation's subsequent feudalization after reconquest. See Ramos, supra note 15,
at 26-30. Codification in France occurred after the revolution, in an effort to create, out of a
judicial system governed by a diverse and regional aristocracy, a centralized state with a uni-
fied legal system. See J.H. MERRYMAN, supra note 228, at 15, 27; F.H. LAWSON, A COMMON
LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAW 54 (1955). German codification, on the other hand,
accorded less weight to pure reason. After careful historical study, the Germans endeavored
to codify essential principles of their legal system. J.H. MERRYMAN, supra note 228, at 31;
F.H. LAWSON, supra, at 53.
236. J.H. MERRYMAN, supra note 228, at 26-27.
237. See F.H. LAWSON, supra note 235, at 49.
238. See J.H. MERRYMAN, supra note 228, at 27.
239. Sperl, supra note 73, at 516; see J.H. MERRYMAN, supra note 228, at 29.
240. "Fear of a 'gouvernement des juges' hovered over French post-revolutionary reforms
and colored the codification process." J.H. MERRYMAN, supra note 228, at 28-29.
241. Sperl, supra note 73, at 516.
242. In France, one of the objectives of the revolution, and the resulting codification "was
to make lawyers unnecessary." J.H. MERRYMAN, supra note 228, at 28.
243. Id. at 28. "[T]he French Civil Code of 1804 was envisioned as a kind of popular book
that could be put on the shelf next to the family Bible. It would be a handbook for the citizen,
clearly organized and stated in straightforward language . Id. See Sperl, supra note 73, at
522.
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from judicial decisions in litigated cases-from cases which after
all are not quite like the one now to be decided, and which perhaps
come down from times in which there prevailed arrangements of
life, and therefore a legal order, that contradict those of today.
What judicial or case-law cannot be, that codified law is: a people's
law, no jurists' law of a learned class, but an intellectual possession
of all citizens, as befits our democratic age.244
b. California
This civil law theory and its underlying ideologies do not, in
practice, exist in common law jurisdictions, such as California, which
have adopted semblances of codification. 245 Where such codes exist,
they do not purport to abolish all prior law in the field.246 They also
do not compel judges to decide cases within the code's confines and
do not make any pretense of completeness. 247
An English legal philosopher, Jeremy Bentham, is credited with
introducing the word "codification" into the English language.248
Bentham considered a code as complete and self-sufficing, capable of
development, supplementation, or modification only by legislative en-
actment. 249 He concisely expressed the essence of codification, as it is
understood in the civil law tradition.250
In the United States, interest in codification sprouted early in the
nineteenth century, with an 1837 report by a commission to codify the
common law of Massachusetts. 251 About ten years later, similar in-
terest was voiced in New York. 252 During codification discussions in
New York, a New York attorney, David Dudley Field, vigorously
advocated codification and was rewarded with a place on the state's
newly enacted commission to codify the law.253
Over a span of eighteen years,2 54 Field drafted five codes: Polit-
244. Speri, supra note 73, at 522.
245. J.H. MERRYMAN, supra note 228, at 32.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. C. ILBERT, LEGISLATIVE METHODS AND FORMS 122 (1901).
249. Id. at 123.
250. See Ramos, supra note 15, at 31.
251. See Batiza, Sources of the Field Civil Code: The Civil Law Influences on a Common
Law Code, 60 TUL. L. REV. 799 (1986).
252. Id. at 800; see generally Pound, David Dudley Field: An Appraisal, in DAVID DuD-
LEY FIELD: CENTENARY ESSAYS 3, 8-9 (1949).
253. Pound, supra note 252, at 9.
254. Field worked on the codes from 1847-1865 while also engaged in an active legal prac-
tice. Batiza, supra note 251, at 800.
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ical, Civil Procedure, Penal, Criminal Procedure, and Civil. 255 Field
endeavored to reduce "to a positive code ... those general principles
of the common law, and ... the expansions, exceptions, qualification
and minor deductions, which have already, by judicial decisions or
otherwise, been engrafted on them, and are now capable of a distinct
enumeration. '256 Thus, instead of the fresh adoption of law repre-
sented by codification throughout most of the civil law tradition,25 7
Field attempted to systematically gather the historical roots of the
common law in one comprehensive set of codes.258
Field's work eventually had a greater impact in California than it
did in his home state.259 When the California legislature ratified the
state constitution in 1849, California's legal system, and its social
fabric in general, were rather disorganized. 260 At the time, California
courts administered law handed down from the United States
Supreme Court and from the former Spanish and Mexican
authorities.
26 1
Despite initial urgings to adopt some or all of Louisiana's civil
law,262 in 1850 the legislature adopted the common law of England, as
modified in the United States, as the law of California. 263 Within ten
years, however, confusion again reigned. In his message to the legisla-
255. Id.
256. Field, Codification, 20 AM. L. REV. 1 (1886).
257. Ramos, supra note 15, at 35.
258. In large measure, Field's codification technique directly influenced the Historical
School of Jurisprudence, whose views were then popular among United States legal scholars.
See id. at 35; R. POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 110 (1938).
259. While Field's Code of Civil Procedure was adopted in New York, his draft Civil Code
was finally rejected in 1887. See Harrison, The First Half-Century of the California Civil Code,
10 CALIF. L. REV. 185, 187 (1922); Parma, The History of the Adoption of the Codes of Califor-
nia, 22 L. LIAR. J. 8, 18 (1929).
260. Parma, supra note 259, at 9.
261. Nathaniel Bennet, one of the justices of the state supreme court in 1850, stated that
the court had to search for
authorities in an unfamiliar language, and an unfamiliar system of Jurisprudence, of
ascertaining the law, as laid down in the codes of Spain; in the royal and vice-royal
ordinances and decrees; in the laws of the imperial congress of Mexico; in the acts of
the republican congress; in presidential regulations; in decrees of dictators, and acts
of proconsular governors.
Id. (uncited quotation).
262. In his message to the first legislature, Governor Burnett urged California to adopt the
Civil Code and Code of Practice of Louisiana, while allowing the common law to control
matters of crimes, evidence, and commercial law. Id. at 11.
263. 1850 Cal. Stat. 95. The enactment provided: "The Common Law of England, so far
as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, or the
Constitution or the laws of the State of California, shall be the rule of decisions in all the
Courts of this State." Id.
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ture in 1863, Governor Leland Stanford urged codification of the
state's laws, claiming
[a]ll who have occasion to examine into the statutes of Califor-
nia cannot but be deeply impressed with the state of wild confusion
into which they have fallen. Such is their condition that no person,
not versed in law, can with any certainty of correctness, turn to the
page of our statute book to ascertain what the law is.... The Bar
and Bench find it alike difficult to extract order out of this wild
scene of statutory confusion and chaos.
The necessity of a thorough codification of our laws has been
apparent to the legal profession, and has been frequently urged
upon the attention of the legislature.
264
In 1868, the legislature created a commission "to [p]rovide for
the revision and compilation of the laws of the state of California and
the publication thereof. ' 265 When this commission did not complete
its work by its July 1869 deadline, the legislature created a new com-
mission, with a new deadline of November 1, 1871.266
By 1871, the commission had completed three of the four codes
it would eventually produce.267 The completed Penal Code and Code
of Civil Procedure essentially embodied provisions of law that were
already in force in California. 268 The Civil Code was drawn from
Field's draft Civil Code, with minor changes to adapt it to prior Cali-
fornia legislation. 269
The enactment of the new Civil Code created unique problems
for the California courts. In essence, while the courts had some expe-
rience with statutes in general, they had never confronted a body of
statutes purporting to codify the common law of private rights. 270
Conceivably, they could have treated the code as courts in a civil law
jurisdiction would. Such an approach would have meant considering
the code as the sole source of all rules of law, deciding every case by
reference to the express provisions of the code, or when encountering
a case with no provision on point, deducing a rule from other provi-
264. Parma, supra note 259, at 13 (uncited quotation).
265. 1868 Cal. Stat. ch. 365.
266. 1870 Cal. Stat. ch. 516.
267. Parma, supra note 259, at 15.
268. Id.
269. Id.; Harrison, supra note 259, at 187.
270. Harrison, supra note 259, at 188.
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sions or legislative intent.27' Instead, an influential California legal
scholar, Carter P. Pomeroy, suggested a different approach. 272 To
Pomeroy, the new Civil Code "[did] not embody the whole law con-
cerning private and civil relations, rights, and duties; [but was] incom-
plete, imperfect, and partial. ' 273 It did not attempt to state the mass
of special rules which constituted the body of California law prior to
codification, but dealt with each subject by providing general and ab-
stract definitions. These were occasionally followed by special rules
plainly intended to settle differences of opinion or conflicts of
authority.
274
As to the authority of the new Civil Code when it conflicted with
pre-existing common law rules, Pomeroy proposed that
[e]xcept in the comparatively few instances where the language is
so clear and unequivocal as to leave no doubt of an intention to
depart from, alter, or abrogate the common law rule concerning
the subject-matter, the courts should avowedly adopt and follow
without deviation the uniform principles of interpreting all the def-
initions, statements of doctrines, and rules contained in the code in
complete conformity with the common-law definitions, doctrines,
and rules, and as to all the subordinate effects resulting from such
interpretation. 275
Thus, to Pomeroy, the Civil Code was "not designed to make any
general alterations in the established doctrines and rules of the com-
mon law."' 276 Rather, the Civil Code was "merely a supplement to the
common-law system, altering its rules only to the extent that the in-
tent to do so clearly appeared.
'277
The California courts agreed. In Siminoff v. Goodman & Co.
Bank,278 the plaintiff sued the defendant bank for failing to honor the
plaintiff's check.279 As to the measure of damages, the bank con-
tended that Civil Code Section 3302 controlled. 280 Section 3302 cov-
ered all breaches of obligations to pay money, and limited recovery to
271. This approach was an option for the California courts. See id.
272. See id. at 189.
273. Pomeroy, The True Method of Interprcting the Civil Code, 4 W. COAST RPTR. 109,
114 (1884).
274. Id. at 113-14.
275. Id. at 109-10.
276. Id.
277. Harrison, supra note 259, at 189.
278. 18 Cal. App. 5, 121 P. 939 (1912).
279. Id. at 7-8, 121 P. at 940.
280. Id. at 9, 121 P. at 941.
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the terms of the obligation, plus interest. 28' Plaintiff, on the other
hand, asserted he was entitled to a common-law tort remedy, avail-
able before the enactment of the civil code.
28 2
The court of appeal, after stating its approval of Pomeroy's anal-
ysis,283 found for the plaintiff.284 It held that
[b]efore we should feel authorized to hold that the rule laid down
in section 3302 was intended to furnish the only measure of dam-
age in such a case as we have here, it should be made to appear
clearly from the terms of the statute that such was its intention,
which we do not think does so appear.
285
Thus, according to one commentator, "[t]he Codes have become
glorified statutes merely; the only advantage derived from codification
was the institution of a systematized, accessible conceptualism in the
place of a vague, confused body of case-law. ' '286 Another commenta-
tor states that decisions of the California courts are usually not based
on the spirit of the Civil Code, or on any deduction from the pre-
sumed legislative intent.2 7 Rather, he says the courts seem to live by
the judicial maxim that "[s]tatutes in derogation of the common law
are strictly construed.
'288
Compared to the civil law conceptualizations, California's com-
mon law codification is, at best, a very distant relative. California's
codes were designed to compile existing case law.289 One cannot con-
sider them to exemplify the "creation" of new law, the theory which
drove codification in most of Europe.29° Moreover, unless expressly
prohibited by statute, judges continue to create rules and doctrines,
which violate the civil law notion of separation of powers. Finally,
while the codes are significantly less voluminous than case records,
the cases themselves still contain the majority of law, negating any
281. Civil Code section 3302, at the time, provided, in pertinent part: "The detriment
caused by the breach of an obligation to pay money only, is deemed to be the amount due by
the terms of the obligation, with interest thereon." CAL. CIv. CODE § 3302 (1872).
282. Siminoff, 18 Cal. App. at 9-10, 121 P. at 941.
283. Id. at 11, 121 P. at 941.
284. Id. at 19, 121 P. at 945.
285. Id. at 14-15, 121 P. at 943; see also Rosenberg v. Frank, 58 Cal. 387, 404 (1881)
(construing the rules prescribed by the Civil Code for the interpretation of wills to be in accord
with those previously laid down by the court).
286. Morrow, Louisiana Blueprint: Civilian Codification and Legal Method for State and
Nation, 17 TUL. L. REV. 351, 403 (1943).
287. Harrison, supra note 259, at 197.
288. J.H. MERRYMAN, supra note 228, at 32.
289. See Harrison, supra note 259, at 188-89.
290. See id. at 197.
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hope of achieving the populist goal of simplification. 291
California's common law approach to codification has profound
implications for punitive liability in products liability actions. Con-
sider again Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. 292 In Grimshaw, Ford argued
against the adoption of punitive liability in products liability actions,
stressing that the definition of "malice" intended by the original draft-
ers of Civil Code section 3294293 was "the intent to harm a particular
person or persons .... "294
The court responded that the legislature did not intend to pre-
vent judicial development of common law substantive doctrines in en-
acting the Civil Code.295 Rather, the court noted,
the code itself provides that insofar as its provisions are substan-
tially the same as the common law, they should be construed as
continuations thereof and not as new enactments, and thus the
code has been imbued "with admirable flexibility from the stand-
point of adaption to changing circumstances and conditions." In
light of the common law heritage of the principle embodied in Civil
Code section 3294, it must be construed as a "continuation" of the
common law and liberally applied "with a view to effect its objects
and to promote justice."... [T]he applicable rules of construction
"permit if not require that section (3294) be interpreted so as to
give dynamic expression to the fundamental precepts which it
summarizes.1 2
96
In the court's view, punishment and deterrence of "objectionable
corporate policies" such as those perpetrated by Ford serves the basic
common law principles of punitive damages: "punishment and deter-
rence of like conduct by the wrongdoer and others. '297 In effect, the
court merely restated Professor Pomeroy's assertion of the way judges
were to interpret the Civil Code after its adoption. The court engrafts
new meaning upon "malice." The term no longer denotes action
characterized by wrongful intent. Rather, the court has "dynami-
cally" and "flexibly" defined it as conduct which the common law
might have sought to punish and deter, even if the conduct in ques-
tion did not exist at the time.
291. See id.
292. 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981).
293. For a discussion of what constitutes "malice," see supra text accompanying notes
149-74; see also supra note 132 (Civil Code § 3294 reprinted in full).
294. Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 809, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
295. See id.
296. Id. at 809-10, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 382 (citations omitted).
297. Id. at 810, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
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Disparaging the court's reasoning fails to illuminate the deficien-
cies of interpreting section 3294 in light of the common-law purposes
of punitive damages which existed prior to codification. A commen-
tator remarks that punitive damages "can claim the virtue of allowing
punishment decisions to be rendered on a case-by-case basis, zeroing
in on conduct that has not yet been addressed by the legislature. ' 29
The difficulty with this reasoning lies in the avowed purposes
served by the common-law doctrine of punitive damages: punishment
and deterrence of like conduct. 299 In particular, by departing from
even a semblance of statutory interpretation as practiced in civil law
jurisdictions like Puerto Rico,30° and pursuing these two objectives by
simultaneously expanding and obscuring the standard by which puni-
tive damages are awarded, the court creates analytical and theoretical
inconsistencies with the doctrine's application.30'
i. Inherent Inconsistencies With the Theory Behind Punitive
Liability in California
(a) Ambiguous Pre-code Basis for the Current Standard
By employing Pomeroy's common-law view toward codifica-
tion30 2 in its interpretation of section 3294, the court encounters a
fundamental glitch in its analysis-the fungibility of pre-code com-
mon-law precedents. In particular, punishment and deterrence may
not have been, as asserted by the Grimshaw court,303 the primary ra-
tionales behind the pre-code availability of punitive damages in
California.
298. Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive Damages: A
Comment, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 145-46 (1982).
299. Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 810, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 382; Ford Motor Co. v. Home
Ins. Co., 116 Cal. App. 3d 374, 380, 172 Cal. Rptr. 59, 63 (1981); Rosener v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 740, 750, 168 Cal. Rptr. 237, 243 (1980).
300. See supra text accompanying notes 239-41.
301. While this Comment focuses on structural and theoretical problems behind the Cali-
fornia courts' punitive damage doctrine, practical problems inure as well. In particular, the
question is raised whether the meaningless standard for liability renders the courts' goals of
punishment and deterrence more elusive? See generally Schwartz, supra note 298 (theoretical
problems with deterrence justification).
Since a thorough discussion of these practical consequences is outside the scope of this
Comment, and increasingly lends itself to a mathematical analysis which this author neither
desires, nor is qualified to attempt, the reader should consider looking elsewhere. As a good
start, see Kuklin, Punishment: The Civil Perspective of Punitive Damages, 37 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 1 (1989).
302. See supra text accompanying notes 270-88.
303. Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 809-10, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
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As indicated above, 30 4 California in 1850 adopted the common
law of England, as received and modified in the United States, as the
law of California. 30 5 With regard to punitive damages, pre-1872 cases
and annotations to early versions of the code accordingly looked to
other jurisdictions for persuasive authority.
306
The exact justification for the doctrine of punitive damages in
England, however, remains a subject of discussion.307 While punish-
ment and deterrence represent one possible theory of the origin of
punitive liability, 30 8 another rationale put forward is that the doctrine
gave courts the ability, in cases of aggravated conduct, to compensate
injuries which were not otherwise recognized at common law. 3° 9 The
justification for the doctrine in early American jurisprudence reflected
disagreement over these two rationales,310 with punishment/deter-
rence eventually predominating in this country by the mid-1800s. 311
A tenable argument can be made, however, that the pre-code ra-
tionale in California of "punishment and deterrence" cited by the
court of appeal in Grimshaw,312 was, in reality, a judicial smokescreen
to justify the awarding of otherwise unavailable compensatory
damages.
A case in point is the California Supreme Court's 1860 opinion in
Dorsey v. Manlove,31 3 cited by the Grimshaw court in support of an
extension of punitive liability beyond torts involving animus malus.31 4
In Dorsey, the plaintiff was driving cattle from Southern to Northern
304. See supra text accompanying note 263.
305. Id.
306. See Mendelsohn v. Anaheim Lighter Co., 40 Cal. 657 (1871); Nightingale v. Scannell,
18 Cal. 315 (1861); Dorsey v. Manlove, 14 Cal. 553 (1860); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294, Code
Commissioners' Annotation (A.L. Bancroft & Co., Sumner Whitney & Co. 1874).
307. See I L. SCHLUETER & K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 1.3 (2d ed. 1989); 1 J.
GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.02 (1984); K. RED-
DEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.2(A)(2) (1980); Kuklin, supra note 301, at 3-5; Sales & Cole,
Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1119-22
(1984).
308. See L. SCHLUETER & K. REDDEN, supra note 307, § 1.3(E)-(F); K. REDDEN, supra
note 307, § 2.2(D)-(E); J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 307, § 1.02.
309. In support of this theory, commentators point to the then general unavailability of
damages for mental anguish, hurt feelings, wounded dignity, or insult. See L. SCHLUETER &
K. REDDEN, supra note 307, § 1.3(C)-(D); K. REDDEN, supra note 307, § 2.2(B)-(C); J.
GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 307, § 1.02.
310. See L. SCHLUETER & K. REDDEN, supra note 307, § 1.4(A).
311. Id.
312. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 810, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
313. 14 Cal. 553 (1860).
314. Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 809 n.12, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
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California.315 Near Sacramento, the defendant, as Sheriff and Tax
Collector for Sacramento County, detained the plaintiff, and acting
under a void or irregular assessment for state and county taxes, seized
and then sold three of the plaintiff's horses in satisfaction of the
debt.3
16
At trial for the taking and detention of the horses, the trial court
allowed the plaintiffs to prove the special value of these particular
horses to the venture, 317 that replacements could not be obtained, and
that the venture could not go forward without them for a number of
days.318 The trial court also allowed the plaintiffs to prove damage to
the cattle herd resulting from this delay,319 and the wages and ex-
penses of the cattle hands during the period.320
The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the admis-
sion of this evidence departed from the ordinary rule of compensation
and exceeded the plaintiffs' allowable measure of damages: the value
of the particular horses plus interest. 321 To the court,
compensation, when applied to cases of this character, has a fixed
and definite legal signification, and refers solely to the injury done
to the property taken, and not to any collateral or consequential
damages resulting to the owner, by reason of the trespass. This can
be considered only in cases more or less aggravated, where circum-
stances are shown which justify a departure from the strict rule of
compensation. 322
Therefore, only in cases involving wanton or malicious motives,
which were absent in the case at bar, could the jury even consider
evidence of consequential damages.
323
The court goes on to state that in cases involving aggravated con-
duct, juries were able to range outside the otherwise permissible
grounds of strict compensation, and award punitive damages "as a
315. Dorsey, 14 Cal. at 554.
316. Id. at 554-55.
317. The plaintiffs asserted that they were driving wild, Spanish cattle, a task which re-
quired experienced cattle hands on scarce and specially-trained mounts. Id. at 554. The plain-
tiffs claimed that the horses taken were of this type, and that they were difficult to obtain. Id.
318. Id.
319. In particular, the plaintiffs claimed that the local land could not support the cattle,
that a number of head were lost, that others were rendered unmarketable, and that the remain-
ing head lost a great deal of weight. Id. at 554.
320. Dorsey, 14 Cal. at 554.
321. Id. at 555, 558.
322. Id. at 555-56,
323. Id. at 556.
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punishment for the act, or as a warning to others. ' 324 The punish-
ment language notwithstanding, the court seemed simply more com-
fortable in bending the then applicable rules of causation in cases
involving more egregious conduct on the part of the defendant. 325
Arguably, the ability of the plaintiff to prove consequential inju-
ries of this nature was due solely to the court's interest in punishing
the defendant's egregious conduct. However, this argument ignores
the fact that if punishment and deterrence were the actual motives,
plaintiffs could merely present evidence of the requisite malice, and
forego the time and effort involved in proving an attenuated line of
causation.326 Rather, punitive liability, it can be asserted, provided
early California courts with the intellectual cover to recognize injuries
or redress harms, with which they were otherwise uncomfortable.
3 27
To be sure, as enacted in 1872, section 3294 appears to codify
punishment and deterrence. 328 The court, however, looks beyond the
intent behind the statute's codification, and focuses instead on an am-
324. Id.
325. See Dorsey, 14 Cal. at 556-57.
326. In fact, plaintiffs, in their short brief accompanying the published opinion, claimed
that due to the defendant's alleged aggravated conduct, they were entitled to "full compensa-
tory damages," and that the "compensation must be commensurate with the injury." Id. at
553.
327. See id. at 558; see generally K. REDDEN, supra note 307, § 2.2(B)-(C).
328. Section 3294, as originally adopted, provides:
In any action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where the
defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed, the
jury, in addition to the actual damages, may give damages for the sake of example,
and by way of punishing the defendant.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (A.L. Bancroft & Co., Sumner Whitney & Co. 1874).
The last phrase of section 3294 notwithstanding, the intent of the legislature with regard
to the justification for punitive liability may be somewhat ambiguous. A tenable argument can
be made that not only did early post-codification legislatures intend to limit the types of con-
duct meriting punitive liability to intentional torts, but that the rationale behind the awarding
of exemplary damages was equally compensatory in nature. See, e.g., Lange v. Schoettler, 115
Cal. 388, 391-92 (1896) (interpreting an 1874 amendment to the California wrongful death
statute to prohibit the award of punitive damages in wrongful death actions). The court stated
that the purpose of the amendment was to preclude damages for "any grievance personal to
the deceased, or any damage allowed in the interest of the people as punishment." Id.
If punishment of a defendant's conduct and deterrence of like conduct were the primary
purposes of punitive damages at codification, it would make little sense for early California
courts to allow their recovery when a plaintiff was only injured, and deny them, when the
conduct caused his or her death. This inconsistency did not escape the Grimshaw court when
considering an appeal from a denial of punitive liability in a consolidated wrongful death ac-
tion arising out of the accident. Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 834, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 398. To
the court viewing punitive liability through its punishment/deterrence lens, this inconsistency
Loy. L.A. Intl & Comp. L.J
biguous common-law precedent as the key to its interpretation. 329 To
the court, section 3294 must be interpreted to give "dynamic expres-
sion" to the underlying common-law precepts which it summarizes:
punishment and deterrence. 330 As the preceeding discussion indi-
cates, however, the Grimshaw court, stands on less than firm ground,
when it cites to the Dorsey case, for the "common law heritage" of
punishment and deterrence embodied in Civil Code section 3294.331
Unfortunately, this is unavoidable. An ambiguous or inconsistent
common-law record is the inherent difficulty with Pomeroy's theory
of codification.
(b) Inconsistencies in the Doctrine's Application
Debates over ambiguous precedents aside, the real difficulty with
the court's "dynamic expression" method of interpretation is its crea-
tion of a standard for punitive liability which is as uncertain as it is
flexible. Despite the court's citation to the "conscious disregard"
standard adopted in Searle33 2 and Taylor v. Superior Court,333 and
subsequently codified by the legislature in 1980,334 it fails to expressly
limit punitive liability to cases which meet this standard.33 5 Rather,
the court, through "dynamic expression," implies that punitive liabil-
ity may attach to commercial torts where criminal sanctions do not
provide a sufficient protection to the consumer, and private individu-
als require an added economic incentive to pursue court action. 336 In
short, punitive liability should be available whenever a particular
judge or jury's notion of justice would be served.
3 37
In direct contrast to the strict form of statutory interpretation
prevalent in civil law jurisdictions like Puerto Rico, 338 this standard
creates further inconsistencies in the doctrine's application. To begin
was "difficult to explain," and an "anomaly." Id. As long as punishment of culpable conduct
is the goal, it makes little difference whether the decedent or his or her heirs brings the action.
However, if compensation was an equally valid justification to early legislators, denying
what is essentially an assignment of a cause of action explains the inconsistency.
329. Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 809-10, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
330. Id. at 810, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
331. Id. at 809 n.12, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
332. 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975).
333. 24 Cal. 3d 890, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693, 598 P.2d 854 (1979).
334. See Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 807-08 n.ll, 174 Cal. Rptr. 381; supra text ac-
companying notes 136-37.
335. Grmshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 808-10, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 381-82 (1981).
336. See id. at 810, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
337. See id. at 809-10, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
338. See supra text accompanying notes 239-41.
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with, the court runs head on into the precedent it cites in support of
its "common law heritage" of punishment and deterrence. After re-
versing the award of consequential damages, the Dorsey court admon-
ished its lower courts as follows:
It too frequently happens that the Courts, in their zeal to adminis-
ter what they deem to be justice, and to compel parties to make
complete reparation for injuries resulting from their wrongful acts,
involve themselves in difficulties of the most embarrassing charac-
ter. The rules which have been established to relieve this branch of
judicial inquiry from its practical embarrassments, should be ad-
hered to with undeviating firmness. 339
Further, while arguably just dicta,340 the Grimshaw court creates
a standard which is really no standard at all. This lack of substantive
guidelines, particularly in the products context, ensures that the com-
mon law's purported goals of punishment and deterrence are not ef-
fectively realized. To begin with, if the punishment and deterrence of
objectionable corporate policies indeed serves the purposes of punitive
damages, 341 a condition precedent to the realization of these goals is
an awareness of the conduct which will subject a manufacturer to lia-
bility. 342 A flexible standard of liability, however, inherently provides
little assurance that despicable conduct will always go punished and
innocent conduct will always be absolved. 343
Second, the pursuit of punishment and deterrence requires ad-
herence to the admonition that the punishment fit the particular
wrongdoing. 344 Jurors in California, however, enjoy an almost unfet-
tered discretion in the amount of punitive damages they may
339. Dorsey, 14 Cal. at 558,
340. Assuming arguendo that the court was correct in its focus on pre-codification com-
mon law for interpreting section 3294, its resulting punishment and deterrence rationales
would clearly support an extension of the applicable standard to a conscious disregard of the
safety of others. Further, as the court indicates, there was substantial evidence in the record to
support a finding that Ford's conduct met this standard. Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 813,
174 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
341. Id. at 810, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
342. See Ausness, supra note 11, at 40, 82; see also Owen, Civil Punishment and the Public
Good, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 103, 114 (1982).
343. See J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 307, § 207; Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in
the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 39-40, 52-53 (1982). Of potentially equal
concern to society is that the uncertainty of punitive liability will deter manufacturers from
engaging in research and development aimed at relieving current societal problems. See id. at
46-53; see also Browning-Ferris v. Kelco Disposal, 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2924 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
344. See Schwartz, supra note 298, at 141; Ausness, supra note 11, at 57.
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award.345 An obscure standard of liability exacerbates this lack of
control, particularly in the products context, as evidence admissible
for the underlying action 346 and the almost standardless punitive rem-
edy 347 threatens to unduly prejudice the jury.34 8 Thus, the lack of any
meaningful control over juror discretion leads to disparate punish-
ment of otherwise similar conduct and clouds the arguably clear de-
terrent message communicated to other manufacturers. 34
9
Further, members of the United States Supreme Court, over its
345. See CAL. JURY INSTRUCTIONS (BAJI) No. 14.72.2 (West Supp. 1990) (discretion to
be exercised without "passion or prejudice," while considering "reprehensibility" of conduct,
"deterrent effect," and "reasonable relation" to the injury). Appellate review and meager pro-
cedural protections provide the only check on absolute jury discretion. See Rosener v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 740, 168 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1980) ($10 million punitive award
accompanying $158,000 compensatory judgment vacated); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3295
(West Supp. 1991) (procedural protections--e.g., bifurcation, admissibility of evidence--but
no substantive limits).
However, on appellate review, the same reasoning, which creates the questionable stan-
dard for liability to begin with, may resurface to rubber-stamp the jury's verdict. See, e.g.,
Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. at 820-21, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 389 (citing lack of government protec-
tion of consumers for propriety of $7.7 million punitive award).
346. Under California strict products liability, a product may be proven defective in two
ways:
First, a product may be found defective in design if the plaintiff establishes that the
product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used
in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner. Second, a product may alterna-
tively be found defective in design if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product's
design proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to establish, in light of
the relevant factors, that, on balance, the benefits of the challenged design outweigh
the risk of danger inherent in such design.
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237-38, 573 P.2d 443,
455-56 (1978).
In Grimshaw, however, the court of appeal, in support of its flexible standard, noted that
"in commerce-related torts, the manufacturer may find it more profitable to treat compensa-
tory damages as a part of the cost of doing business rather than to remedy the defect." Grim-
shaw, 119 Cal. App. at 810, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 382. The court went on to condemn Ford for
"engaging in a cost-benefit analysis balancing lives and limbs against corporate profits." Id. at
813, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
The difficulty implicit in a products liability action where the plaintiff pursues the second
Barker defect standard, therefore, is that the defendant is required to present, as its defense,
the same conduct condemned by the court of appeal in Grimshaw. See Schwartz, supra note
298, at 150-52.
347. Employing a standard that is as wide as the demands of the "wrongful" conduct in
question permits the introduction of otherwise irrelevant evidence. Once a court determines
that a particular conduct, if proven, is wrongful, an expert can easily be found to testify that a
responsible manufacturer would have conducted more testing or designed the product differ-
ently. See, e.g., West v. Johnson & Johnson Products, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 3d 831, 851-52, 220
Cal. Rptr. 437, 447-48 (1985) (failure of tampon manufacturer to conduct research of a previ-
ously rare vaginal bacteria labeled an act of "unbelievable irresponsibility").
348. See Owen, supra note 100, at 117.
349. See Ellis, supra note 343, at 56.
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past few terms, have expressed increasing concern over the "skyrock-
eting" punitive judgments being awarded by state and federal ju-
ries.350 This trepidation stems from the lack of any substantive
guidance for jurors to determine the amount of punitive awards 351
and has led the Court to question whether the lack of appropriate
standards violates due process under the United States Constitu-
tion.352 In April 1990, the Court responded by granting certiorari in
Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip353 and will decide the question
during the October 1990 term.354
(c) Inherent Inconsistency With the State's Prohibition Against
Common Law Crimes
Although punitive damages do not presently constitute a crimi-
nal violation, 355 their avowed purposes are similar, if not identical, to
those of the criminal law.356 The two sanctions are distinguished
solely by the applicable substantive and procedural laws governing
the respective actions---civil versus penal. 35 7 Semantic niceties aside,
350. See Browning-Ferris v. Kelco Disposal, 109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989) (all nine justices wrote
or joined opinions questioning the due process propriety of unfettered juror discretion in
awarding excessive punitive damages); Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71,
86-89 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
351. See Browning-Ferris v. Kelco Disposal, 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2923 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
concurring), where Justice Brennan questions the effectiveness of jury instructions, similar to
California's (BAJI No. 14.72.2, supra note 345) in limiting jury discretion:
Guidance like this is scarcely better than no guidance at all. I do not suggest that the
instruction itself was in error .... The point is, rather, that the instruction reveals a
deeper flaw: the fact that punitive damages are imposed by juries guided by little
more than the admonishment to do what they think is best. Because "[t]he touch
stone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of govern-
ment," I for one would look longer and harder at an award of punitive damages
based on such skeletal guidance than I would at one situated within a range of penal-
ties as to which responsible officials had deliberated and agreed.
Brown-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2923.
352. Brown-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2923. For an illuminating analysis of procedural due
process, see Note, Rafeedie v. Immigration and Naturalization Service: Summary Exclusion
and the Procedural Due Process Rights of Permanent Resident Aliens, 13 Loy. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 179 (1990) (authored by S. Simerlein).
353. 553 So. 2d 537 (Ala. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1780 (No. 89-1279).
354. See Crovitz, Justices Can Limit Punitive Damages-and Save Babies, Wall St. J., Oct.
10, 1990, at A17, col. 1.
355. Schwartz, supra note 298, at 145.
356. See W. PROSSER, supra note 64, at 9; see also Ford, The Constitutionality of Punitive
Damages, in DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES 15,
18 (D. Hirsch & J. Pouros ed. 1969) (comparing policy similarities between punitive liability
and criminal liability); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 11 (1972).
357. See Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 811-12, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 383; Toole v. Richard-
son-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 716-17, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 417-18 (1967).
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however, punitive damages often equal or exceed statutory criminal
fines for the same conduct. 358 Further, punitive liability carries the
risk of stigmatization 359 and loss of livelihood, 36° consequences which
can likewise flow from a criminal prosecution.361
358. Ford, supra note 356, at 18; see Tozer, Punitive Damages and Products Liability, 39
INS. COUNS. J., 300, 301 (1972) (citing punitive damage awards running up to $100,000,000);
see also Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 810, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 382 (citing failure of the criminal
law to protect consumers as justification for extending "malice" as defined in section 3294 to
design defects); discussion of Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir.
1967) at supra text accompanying notes 177-87.
359. At least one opponent of punitive liability concedes that punitive damages do not
carry the stigmatization of a criminal sanction. Ford, supra note 356. When applied to a
single defendant in an intentional tort action, this concession might be warranted. See Hoff-
man Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 498-99 (1981) (indicating that the
United States Supreme Court extends greater tolerance to potentially vague civil statutes, since
the consequences of error are less severe); L. SCHLUETER & K. REDDEN, supra note 307,
§ 3.6. However, to the corporate defendant, the stigmatization of punitive liability can equal
that of a criminal fine, and in any event, clearly exceeds that of a compensatory award.
Consider, for example, Ford's market position after Grimshaw. If the judgment had been
limited to compensatory damages, an informed new car buyer would simply avoid purchasing
the Pinto-a particular product line of Ford's, proven to have a design defect. While Pinto
sales would be expected to drop, confidence in Ford's entire product line should not suffer
significantly. The same cannot be said after the actual Grimshaw opinion. Armed with the
knowledge of Ford's proven conscious disregard for the safety of its consumers, the same
buyer will not just question the design of the Pinto, but justifiably, every vehicle manufactured
by Ford.
Likewise, a punitive award could deter investment in the enterprise. Simply put, a large
punitive award against a concern sends a message of mismanagement to the investment com-
munity. See Owen, supra note 100, at 1302 n.223; Ausness, supra note 11, at 83. To at least
one court, this disincentive to invest represents a point in favor of punitive liability, in that the
"prospect of ultimate liability for punitive damages may encourage investors to entrust their
capital to the most responsible concerns." Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d
811, 817 (6th Cir. 1982).
360. The products context creates the potential for loss of livelihood in three ways. First,
excessive or multiple punitive awards from a single product can bankrupt even the most finan-
cially secure concern, endangering the livelihood of arguably innocent shareholders, employ-
ees, suppliers, creditors, and other concerns down the stream of distribution. See Ausness,
supra note 11, at 58; Owen, supra note 100, at 1300; see also the discussion of Roginsky v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967) at supra text accompanying notes 177-
87.
Second, both innocent and culpable management employees face termination of employ-
ment either through proxy fights or other attempts of shareholders to exert control over the
concern. See J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 307, § 6.10; Owen, supra note 100, at 1302
n.223; Corboy, Should Punitive Damages be Abolished?-A Statement for the Negative, 1965
A.B.A. INS. NEGL. & COMPENSATION PROC. 292, 298.
Finally, the financial health of the concern and its dependents can be damaged through a
decrease in market share for the entire product line as a result of stigmatization received from
a large punitive award. See supra note 359 and accompanying text.
361. See U.S. v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 791 (1976); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532
n.33 (1971).
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In California, the similarities between criminal and punitive lia-
bility end at their practical effect. In contrast to the Grimshaw court's
theories of codification and statutory interpretation, however, crimi-
nal liability in California is limited, by code, to a violation of a written
Penal Code section or other statute.362 There is no common law of
crimes in California.
363
Based on the practical effect of punitive liability, the argument
could be made that California courts, through their ever-expanding
standard of liability, have been administering a common law of crimes
in the civil courts in violation of the prohibition.364 That argument
must fail, however, since the California Penal Code also preserves all
civil remedies, regardless of whether the conduct is also punishable
under the Penal Code. 365 Nevertheless, the statutory bar against com-
mon-law crimes and the caselaw's interpretation of it point to a schiz-
ophrenia in California law when compared to the courts' treatment of
punitive liability. The stark inconsistencies in doctrine become clear
upon comparing the Grimshaw court's analysis with that of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Keeler v. Superior Court.
366
As indicated above,367 the Grimshaw court bases its extension of
the requisite "malice" in section 3294 to the product's context upon
what it sees as fundamental common-law precepts summarized in the
statute.368 Its arguably strained theory of interpretation, which is
simply judicial discretion restated,3 69 imbues the code with "admira-
ble flexibility from the standpoint of adaption to changing circum-
stances and conditions. 37 0 This flexibility, in turn, allows a court to
punish and deter wrongful conduct which the criminal law has not
addressed adequately. 371 The fact that manufacturers have no fair
warning of the conduct which will subject them to punitive liability
362. CAL. PENAL CODE § 6 (West 1988), which provides in pertinent part: "No Act or
omission, commenced after twelve o'clock noon of the day on which this Code takes effect as a
law, is criminal or punishable, except as prescribed or authorized by this Code ...."
363. Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 631-32, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481, 488-89, 470 P.2d
617, 624-25 (1970); People v. Whipple, 100 Cal. App. 261, 262 (1929).
364. See Schwartz, supra note 298, at 146.
365. CAL. PENAL CODE § 9 (West 1988).
366. 2 Cal. 3d 619, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481, 470 P.2d 617 (1970).
367. See supra text accompanying notes 292-97.
368. Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 809-10, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
369. See supra text accompanying notes 332-37.
370. Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 809, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
371. See id. at 810, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 382 (the court justifies its extension of punitive liabil-
ity to the product's context on the failure of governmental regulation and the criminal law to
adequately protect consumers).
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did not seem to trouble the court. It was sufficient for manufacturers
to know that they "might be liable for punitive damages if [they]
knowingly exposed others to the hazard. '37
2
Flexibility and the ability to fill perceived gaps in criminal liabil-
ity, however, served as the original justification of a common law of
crimes. 373 At least as far as criminal liability is concerned, both the
California legislature and courts have rejected these justifications. 374
In Keeler, the state supreme court refused to interpret the term
"human being" in the state's murder statute to include inutero fe-
tuses. 375 In doing so, the court explicitly rejected judicial exploration
of previously unrecognized wrongful conduct as "wholly foreign to
the American concept of criminal justice .... "376 "The first essential
of due process," the court noted, "is fair warning of the act which is
made punishable as a crime. ' 377 Without this constitutionally-re-
quired "fair warning," a criminal defendant's conduct cannot be pun-
ished retroactively. 378 Further, the fact that the sciences of obstetrics
and pediatrics had progressed since the murder statute's enactment in
1872,379 bringing the life of a fetus within the protected interests of
the code (an argument similar to the Grimshaw court's extension of
"malice"), 380 was not persuasive to the court. 381
The strictness with which the courts construe the two codes, and
interpret their specific provisions is likewise inconsistent. In Grim-
shaw, the court based its broad reading of the Civil Code, in part, on
an expansive reading of a preliminary provision, section 4,382 which
372. Id. at 811, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
373. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 356, at 58.
374. See Keeler, 2 Cal. 3d at 631, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 488, 470 P.2d at 624; CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 6 (West 1988).
375. Keeler, 2 Cal. 3d at 631, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 488, 470 P.2d at 624.
376. Id. at 633, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 490, 470 P.2d at 626.
377. Id.
378. See id.
379. Id. at 631, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 488, 470 P.2d at 624. Penal Code section 187, like Civil
Code section 3294, was originally adopted in 1872. See historical parenthetical following CAL.
PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1988).
380. See Ford's argument that "malice" as originally conceived in 1872 could not have
applied to the mass-marketing of products, which was nonexistent at the time, and the court's
broad reading of section 3294 in rebuttal. Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 809-10, 174 Cal.
Rptr. at 382. See also supra text accompanying notes 292-97; supra text accompanying notes
332-37.
381. See Keeler, 2 Cal. 3d at 631, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 488, 470 P.2d at 624.
382. Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 809-10, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 382. California Civil Code
section 4 provides:
The rule of the common law, that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly
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provides that the Civil Code's provisions "are to be liberally con-
strued with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice." 38 3 To
the Grimshaw court, this applicable rule of construction, among
others, "permit[s] if not require[s] that section 3294 be interpreted so
as to give dynamic expression to the fundamental precepts which it
summarizes.' '384 Section 3294, therefore, as well as other provisions
of the Civil Code, is subject to not only the fair import of its terms,
but to any construction, reasonable or unreasonable, which the courts
may give it.38
5
The Penal Code counterpart to Civil Code section 4386 also pro-
vides that its code provisions are to be construed "according to the
fair import of their terms, with a view to effect its objects and to pro-
mote justice. a3 7 The Keeler court, however, rejected a similarly
broad reading of this language, stating that courts could not go so far
as to enlarge a statute, thereby creating an offense "with the aid of
inference, implication, and strained interpretation .... ,,a88 Further,
the court noted, " '[i]t would be dangerous, indeed, to carry the prin-
ciple, that a case which is within the reason or mischief of a statute, is
within its provisions, so far as to punish a crime not enumerated in
the statute, because it is of equal atrocity, or of a kindred character,
with those which are enumerated.' "389 In contrast to Grimshaw, the
Keeler court, in language more often associated with a civil law juris-
diction,3ag simply refused to "rewrite a statute under the guise of con-
struing it.' ' 391
construed, has no application to this Code. The Code establishes the law of this State
respecting the subjects to which it relates, and its provisions are to be liberally con-
strued with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4 (West 1982).
383. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4 (West 1982).
384. Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 810, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
385. See generally supra text accompanying notes 332-37.
386. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4 (West 1988).
387. Id. Penal Code section 4 provides: "The rule of the common law, that penal statutes
are to be strictly construed, has no application to this Code. All its provisions are to be con-
strued according to the fair import of their terms, with a view to effect its object and to pro-
mote justice." Id. Cf CAL. CIV. CODE § 4 (West 1982) (reprinted, in full, at supra text
accompanying note 383). Note that the word "liberally" is not contained in Penal Code sec-
tion 4. Although this may explain some differences in construction of the codes in the ab-
stract, it does not justify an inconsistent construction given the practical effect of punitive
liability. See supra notes 358-60.
388. Keeler, 2 Cal. 3d at 632, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 489, 470 P.2d at 625.
389. Id. (quoting United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 96 (1820)).
390. See supra text accompanying notes 239-41.
391. Keeler, 2 Cal. 3d at 633, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 490, 470 P.2d at 626.
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These differences in code construction, in turn, highlight two
somewhat conflicting views of the separation of powers and responsi-
bilities in California's state government. In Grimshaw, Ford raised
the argument that the vague standard for punitive liability constituted
an unlawful delegation of legislative power.3 92 The court responded,
however, that the doctrine and application of punitive damages were
controlled by common-law principles, and that judicial development
of the doctrine therefore constituted a "proper exercise of a power
traditionally exercised by the judiciary. '393 Further, the court im-
plied that the need for its judicial action in the products context grew
out of a breakdown in traditional separation of powers-a legislative
failure to otherwise adequately protect consumers.394
In the penal context, however, "the power to define crimes and
fix penalties is vested exclusively in the legislative branch. ' 395 To the
Keeler court, this prohibition against common-law crimes embodied a
fundamental precept of the state's tripartite form of government-
that the decision to extend the sanction of state law to wrongful con-
duct is the province, not of the courts, but of the legislature. 396 The
supreme court's faith in separation of powers proved justified, at least
in the context of feticide, when less than three months after Keeler,
the legislature amended Penal Code section 187 to extend the sanction
for murder to the death of a fetus.397 Any gap in the allowable protec-
tion of human life was thereby filled-without judicial legislation.
Given the analagous practical effects, from the defendant's per-
spective, of both punitive and criminal liability, 398 the inconsistent
roles played by the civil and criminal courts in defining and deterring
wrongful conduct is difficult to explain. Relying on courtroom desig-
nations (civil versus criminal) or civil remedy preservation statutes
may justify these inconsistencies in cases limited to an injured party's
392. Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 811, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
393. Id.
394. See id. at 810, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 382, where the court states "[g]overnmental safety
standards and the criminal law have failed to provide adequate consumer protection against
manufacture and distribution of defective products. Punitive damages thus remain as the most
effective remedy for consumer protection against defectively designed mass produced articles."
Id. (citations omitted); see also supra text accompanying notes 332-37.
395. Keeler, 2 Cal. 3d at 631, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 488, 470 P.2d at 624.
396. See id. at 631-33, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 488-90, 470 P.2d at 624-26.
397. Keeler was decided June 12, 1970. Id. at 619, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 481, 470 P.2d at 617.
Assembly Bill 816 was originally amended to reflect the changes to Penal Code section 187 on
June 24, 1970. A.B. 816, Reg. Sess., 1970. The bill was approved by the Governor on Septem-
ber 17, 1970. 1970 Cal. Stat. 2440, ch. 1311.
398. See supra notes 358-60 and accompanying text.
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compensation. 399 They constitute meaningless formalisms, however,
when attempting to logically reconcile the effects and "substance" of
California's punitive damage doctrine with its prohibition against
common-law crimes.400
These doctrinal inconsistencies between criminal and punitive li-
ability would pose less of a problem, though, if both sanctions were
administered in an arguably fair manner. The Grimshaw court, how-
ever, with a "standard" of liability derived through "dynamic expres-
sion," allows a form of post hoc punishment which the criminal law
refuses to administer to even the most egregious offenders. The ability
of defendants to be aware of the liability they face prior to entering a
courtroom represents one of the principal rationales behind codifica-
tion in most civil law jurisdictions,40 1 and in California at the time of
codification: the ability of lay citizens to be able to understand their
rights and obligations.4°2 The common-law courts of California seem
to have forgotten or ignored such a common-sense approach.
2. The Structure of Codification
The distinction between criminal and civil liability, however, also
raises another difference between codifications in Puerto Rico and
California: the actual structure of the codes.
As indicated above, "codification" refers to the preparation of a
written work which is intended to authoritatively set out the basic
principles and rules of a wide field of the law.40 3 This implies a formal
division between separate areas of the law, with all statutes dealing
399. 'Indeed, as new injuries arise or become quantifiable, courts should be able to compen-
sate plaintiffs for them. W. PROSSER, supra note 64, at 3-4.
400. See Browning-Ferris v. Kelco Disposal, 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2932 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Commenting on the Court's refusal to extend cov-
erage of the eighth amendment's excessive fines clause to punitive damages, Justice O'Connor
stated, "[t]he character of a sanction imposed as punishment 'is not changed by the mode in
which it is inflicted, whether by a civil action or a criminal prosecution.'" Id. (quoting U.S. v.
Chouteau, 102 U.S. 603, 611 (1881)).
The inconsistencies are even more difficult to reconcile when one considers the avowed
purposes of punitive damages-punishment and deterrence. Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at
810, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 382. However, if the standard of conduct meriting punitive liability
constantly shifts through an analysis similar to that in Grimshaw, any deterrent effect is lost in
either the volumes of caselaw, or the whims of individual judges or juries. See J. GHIRARDI &
J. KIRCHER, supra note 307, § 2.09; Owen, supra note 100, at 1283-84; Schwartz, supra note
298, at 145-46; see generally W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 356, at 68 (discussion of lack
of deterrence from common law crimes).
401. See supra text accompanying notes 242-44.
402. See supra text accompanying note 264.
403. See supra note 232.
1991]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
with these areas located in their respective volumes.404 In form, this
structure exists in both California and Puerto Rico. Differences in the
nature of civil liability between the two jurisdictions turn on the ex-
tent to which the jurisdictions adhere to this structure.
a. Puerto Rico
In general, most modern civil law systems are principally based
on the Roman civil law, as compiled and codified under Emperor Jus-
tinian, in the sixth century.4° 5 This codification encompassed the laws
and remedies pertaining to persons, family, inheritance, property,
torts, unjust enrichment, and contracts.406 Although the rules laid
down in this codification have substantially changed since their adop-
tion, their division into the three categories contemplated by Justinian
(Persons, Things and Obligations) address substantially the same set
of problems and relationships.4° 7 Thus, one of the most historic,
characteristic aspects of the traditional civil law is the great emphasis
placed on formal definitions and distinctions in dividing the law.4°8
With respect to Puerto Rico, and its Spanish civil law heritage,
the structural concept of codification may be summarized as follows:
"[C]odification should be understood as a collection of all the laws of
a country, or, in a more limited sense, of those which refer to a partic-
ular branch of the law, under one legal body, the context of which
should contain unity of thought and of time." 4 9
The formal division of the civil code, as codified by Justinian,
reflected the structure of codification within a code. However, similar
divisions in structure exist among the five basic codes typically found
in a civil law jurisdiction: the civil code, the commercial code, the
code of civil procedure, the penal code and the code of criminal
procedure. 410
The overarching dividing point in the civil law tradition, how-
ever, is between public and private law.41 1 Civil and commercial law
comprise private law,4 12 while constitutional, administrative, and
404. For example, the penal code covers criminal law.
405. J.H. MERRYMAN, supra note 228, at 13.
406. Id. at 6.
407. Id.
408. Id. at 90.
409. Ramos, supra note 15, at 30 (quoting 1 SANCHEZ ROMAN, ESTUDIOS DE DERECHO
CIVIL 32 (1899)).
410. J.H. MERRYMAN, supra note 228, at 13.
411. Id. at 91.
412. Id. at 98.
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criminal law make up public law.41 3 This distinction stems from an
ideological assumption of government's role in society. 414 First, pri-
vate law represents that area of the law in which government solely
functions to recognize and enforce private rights. 41 5 In private legal
relations, the government serves as a referee, with the parties as
equals before it.416 In public law, however, the role of the government
is not limited to the protection of private rights. Rather, governmen-
tal action effectuates the public interest.41 7 In public legal relations,
the state acts as a party, and since it represents the public interest, it
remains superior to the private individual.
418
This distinction between private and public law, and the accom-
panying structure of codification, clarifies the Puerto Rican courts'
reluctance to expand the concept of civil liability beyond its compen-
satory scheme. When a party injures another Puerto Rican citizen,
his or her obligation is to make the victim whole. 41 9 However, when a
party engages in conduct that is reprehensible or malicious, the public
interest is affected, and the government must protect it through the
criminal tribunals. Thus, having the government act as both a referee
for, and a party to, a dispute between citizens, offends both the struc-
ture and division of the laws. This is one reason why the Puerto Ri-
can courts reject the concept of punitive damages.
The Puerto Rican codes reflect this concept of division and struc-
ture. Title 31, section 5141 governs obligations citizens have to one
another as a result of negligence or fault, 420 and has been interpreted
to limit damages to those necessary to compensate the victim for his
or her injuries.42I This idea comports with the premise that private
law serves to adjudicate the rights of citizens. Awarding punitive
damages in these cases would impermissibly join the public interest as
a party to a private action. The beneficiary of the public's injury
would not be the public, but the person to whom an obligation has
already been fulfilled.
Reference to the Puerto Rico Penal Code completes the picture.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 92.
416. Id. at 93.
417. Id. at 92-93.
418. Id. at 93.
419. See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 5141 (1968); see supra text accompanying note 66.
420. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 5141 (1968).
421. See Rivera v. Rossi, 64 P.R.R. 683 (1945) (discussed in supra text accompanying
notes 110-19).
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First, Title 33, section 3261 provides that "[tihe penalties established
in this subtitle do not affect or alter the civil liability of the persons
convicted of any offense .... ",422 It therefore establishes a clear dis-
tinction between actions brought under the Penal Code and Civil
Code.
With regard to penalties under the Penal Code, Title 33, section
3284 provides in pertinent part: "[tihe general objectives that govern
the imposition of the penalty are the following: ... (b) Fair punish-
ment of the person who committed the offense ... (e) Consideration
of the deterrent nature of the penalty. '423 In particular, with regard
to fines, Title 33, section 3207 provides in pertinent part:
The penalty of a fine consists in the obligation imposed by the
court on the convict to pay to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
the amount of money determined in the sentence.
The amount of the fine shall be prudently determined by the
court within the limits established in the present subtitle, taking
into consideration the economic situation [of the convict] .. .de-
gree of greed or profit shown in the commission of the punishable
act . ... 424
These statutory passages indicate that the same considerations
which underlie the imposition and amount of punitive liability in Cali-
fornia425 are specifically set forth in the Puerto Rican Penal Code.
Thus, interpreting Title 31, section 5141 given the rules of interpreta-
tion in Puerto Rico and civil law jurisdictions in general detailed
above,426 and the structural division of laws in the codes, the rationale
behind the nonavailability of civil punitive liability becomes clear.
b. California
As to the structure of the California codes, the initial impulse
seems to have been to effect a division similar to those common in
civil law jurisdictions. The primary object of Field in drafting the
Civil Code was to "restate in systematic and accessible form the com-
mon law as it ha[d] been modified to suit American conditions."
427
In his inaugural address in 1871, Governor Booth made the fol-
422. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 33, § 3261 (1983).
423. Id. § 3284.
424. Id. § 3207.
425. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 810, 819, 174 Cal. Rptr.
348, 382, 388 (1981); BAi, supra note 345, § 14.72.2.
426. See supra text accompanying notes 71-73, 239-41.
427. Parma, supra note 259, at 17.
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lowing comment regarding the just-completed work of the Code
Commission of 1870: "the object has not been to change the laws, but
to crystalize them in expression and do away with redundancies and
with the incongruity of a written Constitution and vast body of un-
written law; to generalize the statutes and principles of common law
into a science. '428 Thus, at the time of codification in California,
some effort was made to effectuate the ideal of a division between the
various portions of the law. Indeed, the volumes of California codes
evidence an attempt to divide the law, at least by subjects. 429 How-
ever, the availability of punitive damages in civil actions, both in the
original Civil Code, and in the subsequent case law, confirms that the
ideal of a division in codification structure, as known in civil law juris-
dictions, has not taken hold.
This problem has historically caused consternation in common
law jurisdictions, as evidenced by the following passage from a New
Hampshire case:
How could the idea of punishment be deliberately and design-
edly installed as a doctrine of civil remedies? Is not punishment
out of place, irregular, anomalous, exceptional, unjust, unscientific,
not to say absurd and ridiculous, when classed among civil reme-
dies? What kind of a civil remedy for the plaintiff is the punish-
ment of the defendant? The idea is wrong. It is a monstrous
heresy. It is an unsightly and an unhealthy excrescence, deforming
the symmetry of the body of the law.
4 30
Some California cases, reflecting similar but less vigorous opin-
ions, have adopted the view that punitive damages are disfavored by
the law 4 31 and that "[s]uch damages constitute a windfall, which,
though supported by law in proper cases ... creates the anomaly of
excessive compensation which makes the remedy an unappealing
one. '432 In general, however, the cases fail to notice this seeming ab-
erration in structure, and instead retreat to the refuge of stare decisis,
claiming that "[t]he concept of punitive damages is rooted in the Eng-
lish common law and is a settled principle of the common law of this
428. Id. at 16 (uncited quotation).
429. California has twenty-eight separate codes. CAL. CIV. CODE vol. 6 (§§ 1-653), at IX
(1982).
430. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873).
431. Gomnbos v. Ashe, 158 Cal. App. 2d 517, 526, 322 P.2d 933, 939 (1958).
432. Rosener v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 740, 750, 168 Cal. Rptr. 237, 242
(1980).
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country." 433
Two questions, therefore, must be considered. Does the concept
of civil punitive damages actually violate the structure of the law?
And if so, what difference does it truly make?
i. Violation of Structure and Its Consequences
(a) Punitive Damages as a Violation of the Structure of the Law
In response to the first query, one must look to the actual utilita-
rian structures of criminal and civil liability. On the one hand, crimi-
nal sanctions punish undesirable behavior and attempt to inhibit the
actions of those who are otherwise disposed to commit crimes. 434 In
other words, the goals of punishment and deterrence underlie all
criminal law. 435 Compensation, on the other hand, is of no concern to
the criminal law.436 The action is brought by the state, and the victim
serves only as a potential witness, not as a party to the dispute.437 The
victim will leave the court empty handed. 438
Further, there is a strong moral emphasis in the criminal law.
439
A crime is an offense against the public interest, and a prosecution
serves to protect and vindicate that interest."0 Any compensation,
therefore, should logically go to the public, whose interest has been
violated."'
As to civil liability, however, "[tiort law defines the duties and
responsibilities of persons with respect to each other in civil society,
and adjusts between the parties to a civil suit for the losses incurred
and injuries suffered as a result of the breach of such duties. '" 2 In
essence, the goal of civil law is to compensate victims for injuries re-
sulting from wrongdoers' conduct."
3
It has been urged, however, that this definition of civil liability is
433. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 807, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 380
(1981).
434. Metzger, Corporate Criminal Liability for Defective Products: Policies, Problems, and
Prospects, 73 GEO. L.J. 1, 7-8 (1984); see W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 356, at 11.
435. W. PROSSER, supra note 64, at 7.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 356, at 11.
440. W. PROSSER, supra note 64, at 5, 7.
441. See L. SCHLUETER & K. REDDEN, supra note 307, § 2.2(A)(2).
442. Note, Innocence by Association: Entities and the Person-Enterprise Rule Under RICO,
63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 179, 183 (1988).
443. W. PROSSER, supra note 64, at 7.
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unnecessarily narrow. As with the criminal law, all civil doctrines
equally attempt to enforce rules of behavior. 4" Under this view, civil
liability likewise advances the goals of deterrence and punishment." 5
This argument overemphasizes the role of punishment and deter-
rence in civil liability. Undoubtedly, duty and breach figure into the
calculus of liability. Civil law, however, concerns itself with "the allo-
cation of losses arising out of human activities . ". . . 6 The law of
torts, in particular, focuses on an adjustment of these losses to "afford
compensation for injuries sustained by one person as the result of the
conduct of another. ' '1" 7 Thus, where the government truly only refer-
ees a dispute over the failure of one party to perform an obligation to
another, the appropriate civil remedy is to make the wrongdoer com-
pensate the victim for the injury caused by his or her acts." 8
The proponents of punitive damages are correct, in a literal
sense, when they assert that the civil law "punishes" by requiring a
wrongdoer to reimburse his or her victim.449 The law, however, acts
through its remedies.450 Any punitive effects are really ancillary to
the primary purpose of the remedy which is to reimburse or protect
the individual harmed. 451  The nature of the wrongdoer's conduct
means little to the victim. 452 Rather the resulting physical and emo-
tional injury is the central concern for both the victim and the civil
legal remedy.
453
444. Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Approach, 31 HASTINGS
L.J. 639, 645 (1980); see Comment, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 Harv. L. Rev.
517, 522-23 (1957).
445. See Comment, supra note 444, at 523.
446. W. PROSSER, supra note 64, at 6.
447. Id.
448. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 356, at 11-12; W. PROSSER, supra
note 64, at 7.
449. See Comment, supra note 444, at 522-24.
450. See O.W. HOLMES, THE PATH OF LAW 174 (1897).
451. See W. PROSSER, supra note 64, at 4.
452. As stated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court as early as 1877, "[i]t is difficult on princi-
ple to understand why, when the sufferer by a tort has been fully compensated for his suffering,
he should recover anything more." Bass v. The Chicago & N.W. R.R., 42 Wis. 654, 672
(1877).
Consider the situation of a typical personal injury plaintiff in California. Once compen-
sated for his or her physical, emotional, and mental injuries the particular conduct of the
defendant will make little difference. If anything, more egregious conduct on the part of the
defendant will ease plaintiff's burden of proof on available compensatory damages. See 6
WITKIN, supra note 154, § 1410 for mental damages available under California law.
453. As Dean Prosser stated:
There remains a body of law which is directed toward the compensation of individu-
als, rather than the public, for losses which they have suffered in respect of all their
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In the case of criminal liability, however, the conduct of the actor
is key. 454 The reprehensibility of the act has a direct impact on the
punishment imposed. This is a just result, because unlike the civil
law, the criminal law is concerned with the public's interest.455 In the
criminal context, the law provides a remedy of punishment, thereby
helping to deter similar conduct in the future.456
Viewed next to this utilitarian outline of criminal and civil liabil-
ity, punitive damages, with their emphasis on the punishment and de-
terrence of wrongful conduct, clearly amount to the imposition of a
criminal remedy in a civil proceeding. 457 Beyond the formalistic aber-
ration of mixing compensatory and punitive remedies, however, this
anomaly raises more substantial concerns, which are discussed below.
(b) Consequences of the Violation of Structure
Potentially the greatest difficulty with the injection of criminal
liability into a civil action lies in the remedy available to successful
plaintiffs. Given the compensatory goals of the underlying civil ac-
tion, punitive damages provide an unjustified windfall to the plain-
tiff.458 Society at large does not receive the proceeds from the remedy
imposed on the wrongdoer.459 Why should the victim receive the pu-
legally recognized interests, rather than one interest only, where the law considers
that compensation is required. This is the law of torts.
W. PROSSER, supra note 64, at 6. Thus, while the law of torts allows the state to extract
compensation for an injury not currently protected against by the criminal law, the focus re-
mains on the interests invaded, private versus civil. See id. at 7.
454. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 356, at 11.
455. See W. PROSSER, supra note 64, at 7.
456. See id.
457. See id. at 9, where Dean Prosser comments on punitive damages:
The idea of punishment, or of discouraging other offenses, usually does not enter into
tort law .... In one rather anomalous respect, however, the ideas underlying the
criminal law have invaded the field of torts. Where the defendant's wrongdoing has
been intentional and deliberate, and has the character of outrage frequently associ-
ated with a crime, all but a few courts have permitted the jury to award in the tort
action "punitive" or "exemplary" damages, or what is sometime called "smart
money." Such damages are given to the plaintiff over and above the full compensa-
tion for his injuries, for the purpose of punishing the defendant, of teaching him not
to do it again, and of deterring others from following his example.
458. See Rosener v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 740, 750, 168 Cal. Rptr. 237,
242 (1980); Duffy, Punitive Damages: A Doctrine Which Should be Abolished, in DEFENSE
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES 4, 8 (D. Hirsch & J. Pouros
ed. 1969).
459. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), where Justice
Rehnquist expressed the view:
Punitive damages are generally seen as a windfall to plaintiffs, who are entitled to
receive full compensation for their injuries-but no more. Even assuming that a
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nitive proceeds? Solely because he or she has been injured?
Rather, if society determines through its courts that the conduct
of the wrongdoer constitutes an egregious violation of its interests
meriting punishment and deterrence, why should society itself not re-
ceive the proceeds? No legally justifiable reason exists to allow juries
to bestow awards which should flow into the coffers of society, rather
than the pockets of victims whom the law has already made whole.
46°
However, the uncertain state of punitive damages, particularly in
the products liability context, 46' encourages victims to "roll the dice"
and plead the punitive remedy, even if frivolous.4 2 In response, some
argue that this encourages victims to enforce the law.463 But the re-
sponse begs the question. Whose law does the victim seek to enforce?
His or her own? Society's in general? The judge or jury's?
Further, encouraging plaintiffs to pursue large monetary awards
under an uncertain standard of liability promotes judicial inefficiency.
The uncertain outcome in a products action involving punitive liabil-
ity only increases the costs of litigating it.464 Costs can be expected to
increase throughout pleading. Even a frivolous plea for punitive dam-
ages under a flexible standard of liability is relatively easy to state, and
thereby difficult to strike at an early and inexpensive stage of litiga-
tion.465 Once stated, the plea broadens the applicable areas of rele-
vant discovery for the plaintiff, quantitatively increasing the cost of
litigation. 466 Finally, uncertainty in outcome coupled with an incen-
tive to litigate discourages parties from settling disputes, and increases
the incentive to appeal, once a jury verdict has been rendered.
467
Finally, injecting the underlying theories of criminal liability into
civil litigation results in a total abrogation of legislative responsibility.
As the Grimshaw court and the proponents of punitive liability assert,
punitive damages allow courts to fill gaps in the criminal or consumer
punitive "fine" should be imposed after a civil trial, the penalty should go to the
State, not to the plaintiff-who by hypothesis is fully compensated.
460. See Duffy, supra note 458, at 13; see generally K. REDDEN, supra note 307, § 1.1(C)
(discussion of California Senate Bill 1070 introduced in the legislature in 1979, which would
give punitive damage awards to public interest organizations).
461. See supra text accompanying notes 332-402.
462. In 1989, "one-third of jury verdicts in California led to punitive damages, which aver-
aged $3 million." Crovitz, supra note 354.
463. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 444, at 649-50; see J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra
note 307, § 2.02.
464. See Ellis, supra note 343, at 43-46.
465. See generally Ellis, supra note 343, at 51; Schwartz, supra note 298, at 120.
466. See Sales & Cole, supra note 307, at 1157.
467. See Ellis, supra note 343, at 45-46.
1991]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
protection laws.468 The difficulty with this reasoning lies in the fact
that individual litigants and courts can only develop such policy on an
ad hoc, case-by-case basis. 469 Courts are simply not forums conducive
to the development of coherent and extensive consumer protection
laws.
However, by shouldering the responsibility for consumer protec-
tion, California courts have not only picked up the slack for an un-
willing legislature, they have given the legislature the political cover
to not face this difficult political decision in other than a piecemeal
fashion.470 As shown by the aftermath of the Keeler decision, there is
no reason to believe that the California legislature cannot be forced to
face this decision.471 Political difficulties in enacting these laws
notwithstanding, the legislature cannot delegate its duty to protect
consumers to private litigants.
4 72
Above all, the structural violation detailed above would present
easily-ameliorated concerns if the conduct to be sanctioned was defi-
nite in character. In the products liability context, however, the prob-
lem is more acute. The general inaccessibility and confusion of the
law in California, and the steadfast determination of the courts to en-
force a de facto common law of crimes, provide the opportunity for
what is, in effect, strict punitive products liability.
B. The Problem in California: Strict Punitive Products Liability?
In the punitive damages context, a California jury determines
malice by using the "conscious disregard" standard derived from
Searle.473 Although this formulation of "malice" was seen as liberal-
izing the strict animus malus or intent standard adopted in Davis v.
Hearst,474 the Searle court noted that it was not departing from the
requirement that "evil motive" be proved as an element of "mal-
ice."'475 Rather, the court noted that the "evil motive" inquiry
calls upon the jury to assess the defendant's actual state of
468, Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 810, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 382; J. GHIARDI & J.
KIRCHER, supra note 307, § 2.02.
469. See Duffy, supra note 458, at 10.
470. See supra text accompanying notes 136-43.
471. See supra text accompanying note 397.
472. See Grass, The Penal Dimension of Punitive Damages, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 241
(1985).
473. 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975); see supra text accompanying notes
162-73.
474. 160 Cal. 143, 116 P. 530 (1911).
475. See Searle, 49 Cal. App. 3d at 31-32, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 224.
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mind; it is not satisfied by characterizing his conduct as unreasona-
ble, negligent, grossly negligent or reckless.... The accretion of
judicial definitions of malice has pushed to the fore a number of
imprecise verbal signals which-by color, nuance and suggestion-
invite the jury to punish the defendant for violating the jurors'
standards rather than the law's. Among these imprecise renditions
of the statute are the terms reckless disregard and reckless miscon-
duct. On the assumption that these terms reflect the statutory con-
cept in any degree, their use in isolation distorts the statute. The
central spirit of the exemplary damage statute, the demand for evil
motive, is violated by an award founded upon recklessness
alone. 4
76
Thus, the standard for malice set forth by Searle in the products
liability context, and adopted by the California Supreme Court in
Taylor v. Superior Court,477 was significantly higher than mere negli-
gence or recklessness. The new prerequisite for punitive damages was
conduct characterized by a close relative of the evil motive required
by Davis.
In practice, however, the courts do not adhere to this high stan-
dard. A case in point is Siva v. General Tire & Rubber Co.478 In Siva,
General Tire agreed to recap and retread a tire originally sold to a
customer by another company. 479 After receiving the tire, operators
at General Tire's Los Angeles plant did not comply with General
Tire's specifications and improperly repaired the tire.480 In a subse-
quent field service call, the plaintiff, a General Tire employee was in-
jured seriously when the tire exploded as he inflated it.41
Plaintiff subsequently brought suit on a manufacturer's strict lia-
bility theory. Testimony at trial indicated that the plant manager is-
sued cards to his foremen to note the repairs to be done on each
tire.482 Although General Tire admitted in answers to interrogatories
that each tire was inspected before repair, and that a written report of
the inspection was made, the manager, a Mr. Bannish, testified that
"no written report was available. ' 483 Furthermore, General Tire pro-
476. Id. (citations omitted).
477. 24 Cal. 3d 890, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693, 598 P.2d 854 (1979).
478. 146 Cal. App. 3d 152, 194 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1983).
479. Id. at 154, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 52.
480. Id. at 155, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 52-53.
481. Id., 194 Cal. Rptr. at 53.
482. Siva, 146 Cal. App. 3d at 155, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 53.
483. Id.
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duced no such reports at trial.484 The jury awarded the plaintiff both
compensatory and punitive damages.485 On appeal, General Tire
challenged the punitive damage award.48 6
The court of appeal noted that "[a] corporate employer will be
liable for punitive damages based on an employee's conduct where...
the managing agent ratified the employee's conduct. '487 Further, it
defined managing agent as "an individual who has the discretion to
.. [make] 'decisions that will ultimately determine corporate
policy.' "
While there was "substantial evidence the operators' conduct evi-
denced a conscious disregard of the probability that their conduct
would result in injury to others[,]" 488 the court noted that there was
"no evidence presented that the operators had the discretion to exceed
General's written standards for repairs of this nature and accordingly
the jury could not have found they were acting in a managerial
capacity. ' '489
The court did not adhere so strictly to the statute in assessing
Mr. Bannish's culpability. The following summarizes the court's
analysis as to how Bannish's "conduct" provided the basis for puni-
tive liability against General:
The jury could reasonably infer from the conflict in Bannish's
testimony and General's interrogatory responses that Bannish
knew the extent of damage to the tire but failed to write an inspec-
tion tag. The jury then could have concluded that because at least
two and possibly several other workers saw the extent of the re-
pairs, there was an implicit local policy to disregard General's
written standards.... The jury could thus infer the Los Angeles
plant disregarded the corporation's specifications. Where there are
production errors followed by other serious errors in a setting
which indicates the managers are simply not looking at the final
product, a jury can properly find the managers have instituted a
policy which tacitly approves the work done. The tacit approval of
misconduct in the circumstances of this case constitutes ratification
of it.490
484. Id.
485. Id. at 154, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 52.
486. Id.
487. Siva, 146 Cal. App. 3d at 159, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 55, citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294
(1983)). For the complete text of section 3292(b), see supra note 132.
488. Siva, 146 Cal. App. 3d at 159, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
489. Id.
490. Id.
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Superimposed upon the standard for malice set down in Searle,
one must ask where the evil motive was in Siva? The court points to
no evidence that Bannish "consciously disregarded" corporate stan-
dards, or that he failed to enforce them in this instance. The court
merely resorts to the most creative of mental gymnastics to infer Ban-
nish's, and thereby General Tire's, "tacit approval" of the operator's
negligence.491 In fact, the Searle decision is curiously absent from the
opinion. The Siva court merely cites to the Grimshaw opinion for the
availability of punitive damages in products liability actions.
492
Further, despite the court's emphasis, it points to no evidence
that Bannish actually made decisions that "ultimately determine[d]
corporate policy. '493 Bannish, as the court notes, merely served as
the local plant manager.494 In short, General Tire was subjected to
punitive liability strictly as a result of the negligent supervision of
some of its employees.
In light of Searle, Siva essentially stands for the proposition that
prior to the 1987 amendment of section 3294,495 there was no stan-
dard for the imposition of punitive liability in products liability ac-
tions. As a result, a corporation, no matter how careful, could suffer
punitive liability merely by placing its product, whose defectiveness
resulted from the negligence of an employee, in the stream of
commerce.
For all practical purposes, California, with its lack of an ascer-
tainable standard for malice and its imposition of de facto criminal
sanctions in civil trials, had adopted strict punitive products liability.
The latin maxim, caveat emptor, whose effect originally gave rise to
the doctrine of products liability, has given way to a doctrine of caveat
fabricator. In California, truly, let the manufacturer beware.
V. CONCLUSION
California and Puerto Rico have a number of substantive legal
doctrines in common. Their laws on products liability as well as
other substantive and procedural doctrines are similar.496 This is
largely due to the commonwealth's practice of adopting legal institu-
491. Id.
492. Id. at 158, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
493. Siva, 146 Cal. App. 3d at 159, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
494. Id. at 155.
495. See supra text accompanying notes 139-42.
496. See supra text accompanying notes 61, 66-99.
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tions, prudently or not, from the mainland.497
The commonalities end, however, when one considers the availa-
bility of punitive damages in products liability. Puerto Rico rejects
the doctrine; California, unfortunately, embraces it. In essence, Cali-
fornia and Puerto Rico's laws regarding punitive damages in products
liability reflect the institutional differences between civil and common
law jurisdictions, and distinct views regarding civil liability in general.
These disparate approaches are, to some extent, a result of Pu-
erto Rico's adherence to the structures and rationales behind codifica-
tion,498 and California's near-complete abrogation of them.499
Further, the role of judges in administering the law highlights a criti-
cal difference between the two traditions, and, to a degree, also ex-
plains why California has moved to adopt the doctrine of punitive
damages, while Puerto Rico has not. 50°
California's approach, however, has created legal, economic, and
social problems for both the courts and the state as a whole. In par-
ticular, in giving the state's punitive damages statute a reading broad
enough to reach the manufacture of defective products, the California
courts have employed a "dynamic" form of statutory analysis based
in large measure on an ambiguous historical record, subject to any
interpretation the court deems appropriate.-0' Further, this resulting
"standard" lacks any substantive boundaries, 50 2 which, in turn, cre-
ates inconsistencies both in the application of punitive liability, 50 3 and
between other substantive areas of the law.504
Finally, by failing to adhere to any separation between codified
areas of the state's law and injecting what is essentially a criminal
remedy in a civil proceeding, the California courts have created struc-
tural and economic difficulties for the state. These difficulties include
inefficiencies in litigation, 50 5 and ultimately a failure to adopt a coher-
ent consumer protection policy. 5°6
While this Comment criticizes punitive damages in products lia-
bility actions, it should not be construed as a recommendation that
497. See supra text accompanying notes 55-99.
498. See supra text accompanying notes 233-44, 405-26.
499. See supra text accompanying notes 245-91, 427-33.
500. See supra text accompanying notes 239-41, 270-88.
501. See supra text accompanying notes 302-31.
502. See supra text accompanying notes 332-37.
503. See supra text accompanying notes 340-54.
504. See supra text accompanying notes 355-400.
505. See supra text accompanying notes 464-67.
506. See supra text accompanying notes 468-72.
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California adopt the institutions and methods of the civil law tradi-
tion. Although the Grimshaw court's infatuation with the flexibility
and dynamic nature of the common law allowed it to advocate a de
facto common law of crimes, 50 7 this flexibility and dynamic nature
also allows California the ability to adapt more quickly to changing.
social conditions.
However, mixing civil and criminal liability without the safe-
guards traditionally appurtenant to the latter is of questionable wis-
dom. 08 Given its unreliable standard of "malice," California's
doctrine of punitive damages in products liability actions, while
designed to protect consumers, can easily work to consumers' detri-
ment. Costs borne by manufacturers eventually are passed on to con-
sumers.509 Consumers may be able to bear the cost when damages are
limited to compensatory amounts. 510 But under strict products liabil-
ity, the increasing frequency of potentially huge awards based on
nothing more than negligence can cause manufacturers to question
the feasibility of marketing even safe products in the state. 511
It is an easy enough endeavor to criticize. It is more difficult to
suggest an alternative. Although the legislature made some strides in
the right direction with the 1987 amendments to section 3294,512 how
the courts will treat these changes are presently unknown.
Rather, this Comment suggests that California should seek re-
payment for the doctrinal loans that were made to Puerto Rico, and
adopt its view toward civil liability, at least in the case of products
liability. By adopting a purely compensatory scheme, the state will
return to the just compromise between consumer and manufacturer
set down in Greenman when California initially adopted strict prod-
ucts liability.
As an alternative for cases like Grimshaw, in which management
has clearly engaged in despicable conduct, one need only look to the
court's own opinion. In advocating the necessity of punitive damages
507. See supra text accompanying notes 355-402.
508. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), where Justice
Rehnquist notes: "Moreover, although punitive damages are 'quasi-criminal,' their imposition
is unaccompanied by the types of safeguards present in criminal proceedings. This absence of
safeguards is exacerbated by the fact that punitive damages are frequently based upon the
caprice and prejudice of jurors." Id. (citations ommitted).
509. See Sales & Cole, supra note 307, at 1161-62.
510. See id.
511. See Browning-Ferris v. Kelco Disposal, 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2924 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Ellis, supra note 343, at 46-53.
512. See supra text accompanying notes 139-42.
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in that case, the Grimshaw court pointed to the fact that
"[g]overnmental safety standards and the criminal law have failed to
provide adequate consumer protection against the manufacture and
distribution of defective products. '51 3
This must change. The legislature must move to enact stiffer
criminal penalties to prevent the sort of corporate conduct con-
demned in Grimshaw. In particular, the legislature should delegate
the investigation and prosecution of the marketers of defective prod-
ucts to the State Attorney General's office. A potential sanction aris-
ing out of any such prosecution would be the total ban of a
manufacturer's product in the California market. 514 Such a solution,
if administered with the protections incumbent to a criminal prosec-
tion, would return some logic to both the California statutory scheme
and courtrooms, and will provide a just result for a situation that is
critically in need of justice.
Paul J. Sievers*
513. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 810, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 382
(1981).
514. Such a sanction, however, would first need to be evaluated as a potential violation of
the United States Constitution's dormant commerce clause. See Kassel v. Consolidated
Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981). Such an analysis, however, is beyond the scope of
this Comment.
* To my extended family, thank you for all of your support and encouragement
throughout law school. To Jody, I dedicate this Comment to you for your love, support, and
patience throughout this endeavor.
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